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Article
Cultural Norms and Race Discrimination Standards:
A Case Study in How the Two Diverge
DEREK W. BLACK
The legal standard for race discrimination—the intent standard—has
been scrutinized and justified for decades, but that conversation has
occurred almost entirely within the legal community. Relatively little effort
has been made to engage the public. This Article posits that the discussion
of discrimination standards must account for and include public
understandings of race and discrimination because race is a socially
constructed concept and discrimination is culturally contingent. Race
discrimination standards based solely upon the legal community’s
perceptions are susceptible to significant flaws. This Article begins the
incorporation of public understandings of race and discrimination by
examining the public’s reaction to a recent cartoon that, on its face, is
racially neutral or ambiguous, but in light of surrounding cultural context
and history is arguably racist. The cartoon generated a flurry of internet
postings, reactions, and polls. This Article systematically studies those
reactions and finds that the public tends to conceptualize race
discrimination differently than the courts and, thus, calls into question the
validity of current legal standards.
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Cultural Norms and Race Discrimination Standards:
A Case Study in How the Two Diverge
DEREK W. BLACK*

Sean Delonas, New York Post, Feb. 18, 2009

I. INTRODUCTION
The appropriate legal measure for race discrimination has been a point
of serious contention for decades. Although the Supreme Court initially
permitted claims based primarily upon discriminatory effects,1 it
subsequently issued a number of decisions that indicate that plaintiffs must
also demonstrate intentional discrimination.2 Disagreeing with the Court,
* Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Education Rights Center, Howard University
School of Law. I would like to thank Dean Kurt Schmoke for his continued support of my scholarship.
I would also like to thank my research assistant Waris Hussain, who painstakingly scoured the internet
for responses to the cartoon and reviewed them. His enthusiasm for the project allowed me to study the
subject with more depth than I had initially anticipated.
1
For instance, in the context of education, the Court initially only required the existence of racial
disparities to support a claim. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 18
(1971); Alexander v. Holmes Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19, 20 (1969); Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391
U.S. 430, 435, 441 (1968). The Court was even more explicit on this point in the context of
employment. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
2
See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 284, 293 (2001) (holding that no cause of action
for disparate impact exists under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and that plaintiffs must
demonstrate intentional discrimination); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66 (1980) (“A plaintiff
must prove that the disputed plan was ‘conceived or operated as [a] purposeful devic[e] to further
racial . . . discrimination.’” (alterations in original) (quoting Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149
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Congress has, in some instances, responded by passing legislation to
reinstate a plaintiff’s ability to assert a claim based on discriminatory
effects.3 Where Congress has been unwilling or, due to constitutional
constraints, unable to reverse the Court,4 scholars have roundly criticized
the Court as misunderstanding discrimination and furthering illegitimate
ends.5 While this issue has captivated courts, scholars, and, at times,
Congress, the public’s appraisal of racial discrimination has been sorely
missing from the conversation. In many respects, the public’s appraisal is
the most important because neither race nor discrimination is a selfdefining concept. Rather, as many, including some members of the Court,
have pointed out, discrimination is an ambiguous term.6 The meaning of
discrimination depends on the context in which it exists.7 Thus, the public,
rather than the courts, adds real substance to discrimination through
cultural norms that determine what is offensive, racist, neutral, or
(1971))); Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977) (“Proof of
racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause.”); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238–42 (1976) (stating that a “purpose to discriminate”
must be shown by plaintiff claiming discriminatory practices in jury selection (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
3
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat. 1071, 1074–75 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2006)) (overturning the Court’s attempt to limit the application of the disparate
impact standard in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 650–61 (1989)); Thornburg v.
Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 71–73 (1986) (discussing Congress’s amendment to Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act reversing the Court’s prior holding that intent was required to sustain a voting rights claim);
see also Civil Rights Act of 2008, S. 2554, 110th Cong. §§ 101–06 (2008) (proposing a fix to the
Court’s holding in Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001)); Civil Rights Act of 2004, H.R. 3809,
108th Cong. §§ 101–06 (2004) (same).
4
Congress lacks the power to reverse the Court on the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, other
than through the extraordinary measure of a constitutional amendment.
5
See, e.g., Barbara J. Flagg, “Was Blind, But Now I See”: White Race Consciousness and the
Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 966–68, 967 n.66 (1993) (listing the
“numerous” critics of the intent requirement). See generally Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial
Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62
MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1050 (1978) (analyzing twenty-five years of Supreme Court discrimination cases
to “account for the dissonance in [its] dialogue); Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination:
The Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279, 286–91 (1997) (criticizing the Court’s
refusal to adapt its approach in discrimination cases to changes in the nature of discrimination).
6
See, e.g., United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201–02 (1979); Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 337 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (recognizing that discrimination is not a static concept, but one that Congress believed should “be
shaped by experience, administrative necessity, and evolving judicial doctrine”); John Devlin,
Louisiana Associated General Contractors: A Case Study in the Failure of a State Equality Guarantee
to Further the Transformative Vision of Civil Rights, 63 LA. L. REV. 887, 906 (2003); Ethan J. Leib,
Why Supermajoritarianism Does Not Illuminate the Interpretive Debate Between Originalists and Nonoriginalists, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1905, 1915 n.40 (2007); john a. powell & Stephen Menendian, Parents
Involved: The Mantle of Brown, The Shadow of Plessy, 46 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 631, 673–75 (2008)
(discussing the ambiguity of the Equal Protection Clause); see also Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., v.
Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 591, 596–98 (2004) (analyzing the ambiguity of the concept of age
discrimination); Lauren LeGrand, Note, Proving Retaliation After Burlington v. White, 52 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 1221, 1242 (2008).
7
See, e.g., Lu-in Wang, Race as Proxy: Situational Racism and Self-Fulfilling Stereotypes, 53
DEPAUL L. REV. 1013, 1020 (2004) (referencing social psychology research that indicates racial bias
and discrimination is “situation sensitive”).
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appropriate. Legal analysis that proceeds without this substance runs the
risk of serious flaws.
This Article lays an initial foundation for assessing whether a gap
exists between legal and cultural concepts of discrimination. As an
exhaustive analysis of our national understanding of race and
discrimination is beyond the scope of any single article, this Article
attempts to focus on but a few core discrimination concepts through an
examination of the public’s reaction to an actual set of facts. In February
2009, the New York Post ran a cartoon that depicted a monkey being shot
by two policemen with a blurb indicating that next time someone else
would have to write the stimulus bill.8 Many readers immediately
connected the cartoon with President Obama. He had been the lead
advocate for the stimulus bill for months and the cartoon’s imagery evoked
memories of past depictions of African Americans as apes.9 Yet, just as
quickly, others defended the cartoon, arguing that it was merely a failed
attempt at humor.10 Debates over race are common, but what made this
cartoon unique was that it raised several questions that go to the core of
discrimination’s meaning and did so in a way that was intellectually
accessible to the general public. Using online media, the public
extensively debated the relevance of outside factors in interpreting the
cartoon, whether the cartoon was or was intended to be racist, whether the
cartoonist’s intent or the effects of the cartoon mattered most, and whether
someone connected to the cartoon simply should have known better.
All of these questions have close analogs in intentional discrimination
jurisprudence. But the public’s answer to these questions in the context of
the cartoon suggests an approach to discrimination that is different than the
courts. In contrast to the courts, the public minimized the relevance of
intent and focused primarily on the cartoon’s effect. In fact, the largest
coherent group of respondents rejected the relevance of intent altogether.
This group argued that the cartoonist was responsible for the consequences
of his actions, regardless of whether he intended them.11 Moreover,
responsibility of this sort effectively imposes an affirmative duty on
individuals to consider the impact of their actions in advance, which
necessarily entails considering the surrounding context.
As the cartoon on its face does not make any explicit reference to race
or President Obama, context and cultural norms offer the only explanations
for the public’s strong reaction. In particular, much of the debate was
based upon historical depictions of African Americans as apes or primates.
8
Sean Delonas, Cartoon, N.Y. POST, Feb. 18, 2009, available at http://www.nypost.com/
opinion/cartoons/delonas.htm.
9
See generally Les Payne, The Post’s Stimulus Chimp, THE NATION, Feb. 27, 2009, available at
http://www.thenation.com/article/posts-stimulus-chimp (discussing the public reaction to the cartoon).
10
Id. (noting the arguments of those who defended the cartoon).
11
See infra Part III.D.
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Imagery of this sort draws upon the purported “scientific” arguments of the
nineteenth century that Africans were a lower order of humans who were
more closely related to apes in the evolutionary chain than whites.12 Thus,
slavery was consistent with the natural order.13 Even after slavery, popular
culture in the United States routinely depicted African Americans as apes
to further the general notion that African Americans were uncivilized and
lacking in intelligence,14 and to justify segregation and other
discriminatory practices.15
A recent study by psychologists at leading universities indicates that
the images are not just part of our distant past. The study found that while
these portrayals have disappeared from popular culture, the historical
impact has been so significant that, still today, “many Americans
subconsciously associate blacks with apes.”16 One of the lead researchers
recently stated:
“Despite widespread opposition to racism, bias remains with
us . . . . African Americans are still dehumanized; we’re still
associated with apes in this country. That association can
lead people to endorse the beating of black suspects by police
officers, and I think it has lots of other consequences that we
have yet to uncover.”17
A familiarity with these historical images and the importance ascribed
to them largely formed the dividing line between those who found the
cartoon offensive and those who did not. Given the prevalence of these
depictions in the past, the largest group of respondents could not imagine
the cartoon as anything but a new example. Others, in contrast, avoided
addressing history at all, arguing on other grounds that this cartoon could
not have been directed at the President. Most telling, however, were those
who, because of youth, were unfamiliar with earlier historical depictions
and, thus, simply could not even appreciate what others were debating.
This Article attempts to bring order to these varying ideas by collecting
readers’ written comments from news outlets’ websites and categorizing
them. In general, the responses were consistent with polls conducted by
other sources,18 but the benefit of analyzing written comments is that the
12
GEORGE BORNSTEIN, MATERIAL MODERNISM: THE POLITICS OF THE PAGE 145–46 (2001); see
also J.C. NOTT & GEO. R. GLIDDON, TYPES OF MANKIND 246–71 (1854).
13
KEVIN BROWN, RACE, LAW AND EDUCATION IN THE POST DESEGREGATION ERA 44 (2005).
14
See, e.g., Americans Still Linking Blacks to Apes, SCIENCEBLOG (Feb. 8, 2008),
http://scienceblog.com/cms/americans-still-linking-blacks-apes-15428.html [hereinafter SCIENCEBLOG]
(discussing a depiction of evolution from chimpanzee to white man in a 1970 illustration entitled
“March of Progress”).
15
BROWN, supra note 13, at 58.
16
SCIENCEBLOG, supra note 14.
17
Id. (quoting Jennifer Eberhardt, a professor of psychology at Stanford University).
18
See infra Part III.C.
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comments offer more than just simplified opinions and conclusions. They
offer rationales and arguments that provide a basis for drawing inferences
that are relevant beyond the cartoon itself. In particular, the comments can
be assessed for their consistency with current and proposed discrimination
standards. This Article’s assessment, ultimately, demonstrates that the
current legal approach to discrimination is inconsistent with popular
understandings of discrimination. Unlike the legal standard, the public
tends to focus primarily on the discriminatory effect of actions, but in a
way that on some level still accounts for intent.
Before delving any further into the issues, however, it is important to
note that this Article in no way intends to suggest that First Amendment
rights should be curtailed or that respondents indicated as much. No
matter the intent or level of racism involved in the cartoon, individuals
have the right to express their ideas.19 This Article focuses on this cartoon
simply because it provides a unique opportunity to examine the public’s
unfiltered perceptions of race, racism, and discrimination.
These
perceptions and the principles related to them are the only subjects of this
Article, not whether anyone involved with the cartoon actually warrants
legal censure. In short, the question is whether actions equivalent to the
cartoon, but not raising First Amendment protections, would be
discriminatory and warrant legal recourse.20
This Article begins, in Part II, by summarizing the debate over race
discrimination standards that has occurred within the courts, Congress, and
the academy. It then explains why the wider public is crucial to this
conversation and how the national conversation regarding the cartoon
provides a valuable opportunity to assess the public’s opinion. Part III of
this Article details the actual study of the public’s response, including a
full explanation of the story behind the cartoon, the method for gathering
and analyzing the responses, and the results and conclusions of the study.
The Article ends by analyzing how the study’s results bear on current and
proposed legal discrimination standards, finding that the current regime is
likely flawed.

19
See, e.g., Nat’l Socialist Party of Am. v. Vill. of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 43–44 (1977) (per
curiam) (reversing an order of an injunction against people who wanted to display symbols of the
Nationalist Socialist Party of America); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 456–57 (1969) (Douglas,
J., concurring) (discussing permissible speech).
20
My preference would have been to analyze a situation that did not implicate the First
Amendment, as it admittedly drew the attention of some respondents and will probably do the same
with some of this Article’s readers. Nonetheless, the other aspects of this cartoon were perfect for
study and not easily identified in other contexts, making it hard for both me and most other viewers to
ignore.
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II. THE PAST DEBATE OVER RACIAL DISCRIMINATION STANDARDS
A. The Judiciary, Congress, and the Academy
The legal standards for establishing prohibited discrimination have
varied over the past half-century, generating significant debate and
contention in the process.21 When the judiciary first began to combat
discrimination in schools and elsewhere in the 1950s and early 1960s, the
basic existence of segregation and inequality was sufficient to establish an
equal protection violation.22 With no clear distinction between intent and
effect, plaintiffs could challenge vast racial inequities.23 When Congress
had the opportunity to directly address the issue by setting a standard in the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, it passed on the opportunity and left the final bill
silent as to the requisite intent or standard for establishing violations.24
One scholar concludes that Congress intentionally left the question open
for federal agencies to resolve.25 Regardless of Congress’s intent, agencies
filled the void that Congress created, enacting regulations that prohibited
policies and actions that had a racially disparate impact.26 Thus, proof of
intent to treat individuals or groups differently was unnecessary.
In 1973, however, the Supreme Court distinguished intentional from
unintentional school segregation, holding that a plaintiff must demonstrate
the former.27 Three years later, the Court expanded the application of
intentional discrimination to all race discrimination claims under equal
21
See, e.g., Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264–66, 270–71
(1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238–42 (1976); Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189,
208 (1973); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1507 (2d ed. 1988); Paul Brest,
Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 22–26 (1976)
(advocating for an antidiscrimination principle that in some instances would prohibit disparate impact
and criticizing the Supreme Court’s rejection of disparate impact claims). See generally Freeman,
supra note 5 (surveying and criticizing the Supreme Court’s discrimination doctrine from the 1950s
through the late 1970s); Selmi, supra note 5 (discussing the evolution of the Court’s discrimination
doctrine).
22
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 18 (1971); Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd.,
391 U.S. 430, 435, 441 (1968); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493, 495 (1954).
23
See, e.g., NAACP, Jacksonville Branch v. Duval Cnty. Sch., 273 F.3d 960, 967 (11th Cir.
2001) (analyzing the various aspects of education that courts should examine for inequities per the
Court’s holding in Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968)). In other contexts such as
housing and environmental justice, plaintiffs would be able to challenge various inequities, but for
recent requirements that they demonstrate intent. See, e.g., S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep’t
of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771, 774 (3d Cir. 2001) (rejecting a claim of environmental racism based on
the absence of evidence of intentional discrimination); Latinos Unidos de Chelsea en Accion v. Sec’y
of Hous. & Urban Dev., 799 F.2d 774, 795 (1st Cir. 1986) (requiring residents to prove intentional
discrimination in funding of housing projects).
24
Charles F. Abernathy, Title VI and the Constitution: A Regulatory Model for Defining
“Discrimination,” 70 GEO. L.J. 1, 24–27 (1981).
25
Id. at 28–30, 48.
26
See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 528.9(b) (2002); 24 C.F.R. § 6.4(a)(1)(ix) (2002); 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(2)
(2002); id. § 300.646 (prohibiting disproportionality in special education programs and providing
schools with various mechanism to limit and prevent this its occurrence).
27
Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973).
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protection. Under the intent standard, a racially disparate effect alone is
insufficient to establish an equal protection claim.29 Race must be a factor
that motivated a defendant to act.30 In later decisions, the Court would
further specify that plaintiffs must demonstrate that the government acted
because of race, not simply in spite of the effects it might have on a
particular race.31 In effect, the Court elevated the intent requirement to that
of subjective motive, not objective expectation.32
After accomplishing this shift in equal protection law, the Court
temporarily eroded the disparate impact standard in statutory claims as
well. In particular, the Court held that certain disparate impacts were
insufficient to sustain a claim under the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and
also under portions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.33 Congress, however,
responded by amending both statutes to reinstate a plaintiff’s ability to
challenge practices that have a disparate impact.34 The amendments to the
Civil Rights Act, however, spoke only to employment discrimination, and
the Court has been free to require intentional discrimination elsewhere.
Most notably, in 2002, the Court held that plaintiffs must demonstrate
intentional discrimination under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, which
protects individuals from discrimination in federally funded programs.35
Congress has not responded to recent decisions of this sort and they remain
the law.36 Now, with few exceptions, the intentional discrimination

28
Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264–66, 270–71 (1977);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238–42 (1976).
29
Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 464–65 (1979); Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979); Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 264–66, 270–71.
30
Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265–66.
31
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298 (1987); Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279.
32
See Derek W. Black, The Contradiction Between Equal Protection’s Meaning and Its Legal
Substance: How Deliberate Indifference Can Cure It, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 533, 566–67
(2006) (discussing the lower courts’ preference for an objective intent standard and the Court’s
holdings that required a subjective standard).
33
See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 650–51 (1989) (limiting the
application of the disparate impact standard in employment discrimination cases to specific labor
markets), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074
(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66 (1980)
(rejecting the disproportionate effect of voting policies or districts as the basis for establishing a voting
rights claim and instead requiring intentional discrimination).
34
Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 105, 105 Stat. at 1074–75 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)
(2006)) (overturning the Court’s holding in Wards Cove Packing, 490 U.S. at 642, that limited the
application of the disparate impact standard); Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 71–73 (1986)
(discussing Congress’s amendment to Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act reversing the Court’s prior
holding that intent was required to sustain a voting rights claim).
35
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 284, 293 (2001) (holding that no cause of action for
disparate impact exists under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and that plaintiffs must
demonstrate intentional discrimination).
36
See Civil Rights Act of 2008, S. 2554, 110th Cong. §§ 101–06 (2008) (proposing a fix to the
Court’s holding in Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 275); Civil Rights Act of 2004, H.R. 3809, 108th Cong. §§
101–06 (2004) (same).
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standard controls plaintiffs’ ability to redress racial inequities.
Since the Court first adopted the intent standard, it has been both
vigorously defended and attacked. Those defending the standard argue
that requiring anything short of intent would expose the government and
other defendants to extensive unwarranted liability.38 Racial disparities
exist in almost every facet of public life, and standards that prohibit
disparate impact would create legal challenges to almost all of them.39 The
defenders would concede that, if these social structures were designed to
disadvantage certain racial groups, the law should invalidate them. But in
the case of structures such as our tax system, they argue the government’s
motives are entirely neutral in regard to race and, thus, the system should
not be open to challenge simply because it happens to affect racial groups
differently.40 Many racial disparities exist, not because of governmental or
other institutional discrimination, but because of various private actions
and demographic factors.41 Thus, the government does not produce racial
inequity itself, but simply acts within a system predominated by it. Given
the prevailing unequal system, a disparate impact standard would saddle
the government with the huge administrative burden of continually
reshaping its policies to avoid racial disparities, even when race is not a
factor in the government’s initial decision.42 Imposing these costs on
37

Selmi, supra note 5, at 285 (indicating that notwithstanding the various different constitutional
and statutory laws that apply to race discrimination the Supreme Court effectively has only one
standard: intentional discrimination). Justice Scalia, however, suggests there should be no exceptions.
Rather, if the Constitution only prohibits intentional discrimination, then Congress should lack the
power to prohibit certain disparate impacts. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2682–83 (2009)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
38
See McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987) (allowing a death penalty system fraught
with bias to continue); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976) (permitting an employment test
that disproportionately excluded vast numbers of minority applicants to remain in effect, while noting
that a disparate impact standard might invalidate a host of tax, welfare, public service, and other
statutes).
39
See ADALBERTO AGUIRRE, JR., RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIVERSITY IN AMERICA 27–38, 42 (2003)
(discussing racial disparities through examination of social indicators including educational attainment,
poverty levels, and income levels). For a full discussion of racial disparities, see generally DOUGLAS S.
MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE
UNDERCLASS (1993).
40
Davis, 426 U.S. at 248; Frank I. Goodman, De Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional and
Empirical Analysis, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 275, 300 (1972) (suggesting that disproportionate-impact
analysis might invalidate “tests and qualifications for voting, draft deferment, public employment, jury
service, and other government-conferred benefits and opportunities”); see also Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2672
(granting certiorari on a Title VII claim).
41
See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 102 (1995); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494–95
(1992).
42
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 992 (1988) (“We agree that the inevitable
focus on statistics in disparate impact cases could put undue pressure on employers to adopt
inappropriate prophylactic measures.”); Presidential Statement on Signing the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
27 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1701, 1701–02 (Nov. 25, 1991) (expressing concern with the unfair
burdens and incentives that disparate impact standards create); see also Davis, 426 U.S. at 248; David
A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 935, 956 (1989)
(discussing the intent standard as an effort to “tam[e] Brown” and avoid these costs).
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government or businesses is both inefficient and unfair. Finally, some
defenders of the intent standard conceptualize discrimination as immoral
activity, and disparate impact as only an incidental byproduct of otherwise
moral behavior.44
As those objecting to the intent standard have found increasingly little
affirmation in case law, their normative and practical critiques of the
standard have been far more extensive. First, one of the more prevalent
critiques among legal scholars is that most modern discriminatory action
results from subconscious biases rather than from a conscious desire to
discriminate.45 Developments in social science reveal that, although we
are rarely consciously aware of it, our decisions and actions are
subconsciously affected by various stereotypes, racial associations, and
biased messages that dominate our culture.46 The intent standard, however,
focuses on conscious motivations. Thus, even though race is often a factor
in why someone acted in a particular way, the current intent standard fails
to account for it.47 In effect, the intent standard is premised on the
historical “bigoted decision-maker,”48 rather than the current reality where
explicit racial bias is no longer acceptable and, consequently, operates well
below the conscious surface.49
Second, as a practical matter, the standard is simply difficult to
administer.50 Because the standard searches for subjective motivations, it
often places a nearly insurmountable burden on plaintiffs to demonstrate
the inner workings of an individual’s mind.51 In the absence of direct
43
See Jennifer C. Braceras, Killing the Messenger: The Misuse of Disparate Impact Theory to
Challenge High-Stakes Educational Tests, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1111, 1190–1201 (2002) (arguing against
the use of disparate impact in educational testing contexts); Disparate Impact, CENTER FOR EQUAL
OPPORTUNITY (July 16, 2007), http://www.ceousa.org/content/view/339/96/.
44
See Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Biases, Preferences,
Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 212–14 (1992).
45
This argument dates back to Charles Lawrence’s seminal piece on the subject, The Id, the Ego,
and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 335 (1987).
46
Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons from Cognitive Social Psychology, 49
UCLA L. REV. 1241, 1276 (2002); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A
Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV.
1161, 1186–1211 (1995).
47
See Lawrence, supra note 45, at 323.
48
See TRIBE, supra note 21, at 1509 (indicating the Court was still looking for the “bigoted
decision-maker”); Selmi, supra note 5, at 335 (discussing the Court’s difficulty in shifting from a
segregation mentality).
49
E.g., DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 401 (5th ed. 2004); Tristin K.
Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment
Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 91–96 (2003) (discussing the shift in the nature of
discrimination from conscious animus to unconscious bias).
50
Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 225–26 (1973) (discussing the problem courts have in
resolving intent necessary to establish de jure discrimination in the context of compulsory student
transportation); Strauss, supra note 42, at 953 (finding that one can only speculate as to how a different
group would have been treated).
51
See, e.g., United States v. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 573 F.2d 400, 413 (7th Cir. 1978); Hart v.
Cmty. Sch. Bd. of Educ., N.Y. Sch. Dist. No. 21, 512 F.2d 37, 50 (2d Cir. 1975) (“To say that the
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evidence of racial motivations, the trier of fact can only speculate,52 and
speculation makes the outcome heavily dependent on the fact-finder’s own
world view, opinions, and biases, rather than any real evidence.53 As a
result, the intent standard can lend itself to inconsistent and unreliable
outcomes.54 Yet, as a practical matter, modern courts generally refuse to
make the inferences necessary to find discrimination.55 Ironically, the
intent standard for race (and gender) is inconsistent with the intent
standards for other constitutional and civil rights violations, which either
do not require intent at all or base intent on objective facts relating to
foreseeability.56 Recognizing these problems, some conclude that a
disparate impact standard is simply an efficient means for identifying
conduct that often involves intentional discrimination on some level, but
which is difficult to prove.57
Third, scholars argue that the intent standard reinforces the status quo
and protects white interests. In nearly every sphere of life, racial
foreseeable must be shown to have been actually foreseen would invite a standard almost impossible of
proof save by admissions.”). Similarly, the Sixth Circuit wrote:
[I]t would be difficult, and nigh impossible, for a district court to find a [defendant]
guilty of [intentional discrimination], unless the court is free to draw an inference of
[discriminatory] intent or purpose from a pattern of official action or inaction which
has the natural, probable and foreseeable result of increasing or perpetuating [a
racially disparate impact].
NAACP v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 559 F.2d 1042, 1047–48 (6th Cir. 1977).
52
See Keyes, 413 U.S. at 225–27; Strauss, supra note 42, at 953–68 (noting that one can only
speculate as to how a different group would have been treated).
53
See City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 141–47 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(discussing his differing interpretation of the racial import of various facts, such as the implicit
meaning of “undesirable traffic”); Herbert A. Eastman, Speaking Truth to Power: The Language of
Civil Rights Litigators, 104 YALE L.J. 763, 771 (1995) (explaining the difficulty federal judges may
have in relating to the plight of poor blacks in Cairo, Illinois); Freeman, supra note 5, at 1052 (noting
“the lack . . . of any objective criteria to which one might appeal to justify particular substantive
decisions”); Selmi, supra note 5, at 280–83 (arguing that “how one defines discrimination, specifically
how the Court has defined discrimination, is premised on one’s expectations of what a
nondiscriminatory world would look like”).
54
See Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Effects of Intent: Do We Know How Legal
Standards Work?, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1151, 1190 (1991) (detailing empirical findings that show a
pattern of failing to infer discrimination); Strauss, supra note 42, at 938 (arguing that “when the
discriminatory intent standard is applied rigorously, it defeats itself . . . by dissolving into questions that
are speculative and, in some instances, literally meaningless”).
55
Eisenberg & Johnson, supra note 54, at 1182–83.
56
See, e.g., Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 231–32 (2005) (recognizing a disparate
impact claim in age discrimination claims); Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 299 (1985)
(recognizing a disparate impact claim for disability claims); Duvall v. Cnty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124,
1138 (9th Cir. 2001) (determining that the deliberate indifference standard applies); Powers v. MJB
Acquisition Corp., 184 F.3d 1147, 1153 (10th Cir. 1999) (affirming that petitioner had to prove
intentional discrimination); Bartlett v. N.Y. Bd. Law Exam’rs, 156 F.3d 321, 331 (2d Cir. 1998)
(quoting Ferguson v. City of Phoenix, 931 F. Supp. 688, 697 (D. Ariz. 1996)); Black, supra note 32, at
537–42 (comparing race discrimination to other civil rights and discrimination claims).
57
See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987 (1988) (noting that some disparate
impacts are equivalent to intentional discrimination); Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and
Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 493, 495–96, 520–21 (2003) (discussing disparate
impact as an attempt to get at intentional discrimination, historical segregation, and unequal structures).
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minorities lag behind whites. While many of these inequities stem from
past governmental and private discrimination, the creation and
continuation of these inequities does not happen of its own accord, nor is it
natural.59 Rather, the continuation of racial inequity is perpetually
dependent on active decisions and policies that institutions and individuals
make on a regular basis.60 To some, these decisions appear to be business
as usual, rather than the perpetuation of discrimination, but they are,
nonetheless, value choices to protect existing interests and structures. By
limiting plaintiffs’ claims to those involving current conscious efforts to
discriminate, the intent standard simply masks and protects the decisions to
perpetuate the racial status quo.61 Regardless of the harm or injustice of
these decisions, the intent standard treats them as neutral if they cannot be
connected to a direct racial consideration.62 Thus, rather than challenging
the status quo, the intent standard makes equal protection law a defense for
it. In this respect, some scholars go even further and assert that the intent
standard protects “whiteness.”63 If white norms can be tied to something
other than racial animus, the intent standard treats them as neutral and
beyond challenge, notwithstanding the racially disparate impacts that result
by acting upon these norms.64 Or as one scholar argues, the intent standard
operates from the perspective of the perpetrator rather than the victim; so
long as the perpetrator does not mean any harm, the discriminatory impact
on the victim is irrelevant.65
Fourth, others find that the distinctions between intentional
discrimination and disparate impact are not significant and are emphasized
in ways that create a false dichotomy.66 The Supreme Court, in particular,
has suggested there is a rigid distinction between impact and intent
whereby disparate impacts are not actually discrimination or a denial of
58

See generally MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 39 (describing past and current trends of
discrimination through a history of segregation).
59
MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN
LAW 77–78 (1990) (concluding that the status quo is not natural, uncoerced, or good).
60
See, e.g., Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 213–14 (1973) (discussing the various
options school boards have and their relationship to continued segregation); MINOW, supra note 59, at
77–78.
61
See MINOW, supra note 59, at 77–78 (discussing the failure of the law to limit the perpetuation
of the status quo).
62
See id.; Freeman, supra note 5, at 1052–57 (discussing the Supreme Court’s perpetrator
perspective which treats the condition of inequality as fair).
63
Flagg, supra note 5, at 966–69.
64
Id. at 964.
65
Freeman, supra note 5, at 1052–54.
66
Black, supra note 32, at 569; Green, supra note 49, at 143 (arguing, in regard to the distinction
between discrimination and disparate impact in employment discrimination, that “[i]t is neither realistic
nor sensible, however, to combat the operation of discriminatory bias in the modern workplace along
such dichotomous lines”). On rare occasions, even the Court has acknowledged that the distinction
between the two is blurred. See, e.g., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987 (1988)
(indicating that some disparate impacts are equivalent to intentional discrimination).
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equal protection. But if the government has an affirmative duty to ensure
equal opportunity among its citizens, the failure to ensure it for particular
racial groups is just as problematic for those citizens as it would be if the
government intentionally denied the group opportunities.68 Moreover, the
racial impacts that a decision will cause are not merely incidental byproducts that are disconnected from the decision-making process; they are
inherently and volitionally connected to and part of the process and
ultimate decision.69 For instance, legislative bodies’ decisions are
deliberate, calculated, and rarely lack a specific awareness and valuation of
the results. 70 If a legislative body by some chance makes a decision in
ignorance and without deliberation, it would seem illogical to say that,
between two actions producing the same unequal opportunity, one is not a
denial of equal protection by virtue of its ignorance while the other is
because of its knowledge. Some scholars further note that the decision
born out of ignorance represents a defect in the legislative process that is
prohibited by due process as well as equal protection, or rather the
Fourteenth Amendment in its totality.71
Finally, the language of the Equal Protection Clause does not even
include the term discrimination, much less require intentional
discrimination.72 Rather, the language speaks only of denials of equal

67
See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2672 (2009) (indicating that intentional
discrimination or “[d]isparate-treatment cases present ‘the most easily understood type of
discrimination’” (quoting Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977))); Alexander v.
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 281 (2001) (assuming that regulations may validly proscribe activities that
have a disparate impact); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 254 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(agreeing that a constitutional issue does not arise every time some disproportionate impact is shown).
68
See Black, supra note 32, at 562 (discussing the government’s failure of equal consideration);
Freeman, supra note 5, at 1052–53 (discussing discrimination from the perspective of the victim).
69
See Lawrence, supra note 45, at 354 (“[C]ases where racially discriminatory impact results
directly from past intentional discrimination or from current but unprovable racial animus will be well
within judicial reach.”).
70
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 135–45
(1980). The legislative or democratic process inherently entails a constant weighing of costs and
benefits in the attempt to indentify the most palatable outcome or policy. The law’s expectation is that
our representatives will not make irrational decisions or unfairly burden particular segments of the
citizenry through this process. In fact, in regard to race, the Equal Protection Clause commands this
fair treatment and consideration. Thus, equal protection no more permits decision makers to mis-weigh
the costs and benefits based on latent biases or indifferences than it permits mis-weighing them based
on explicit racial motivations. Conscious or otherwise, such a decision is an irrational one that treats
races unequally. Id. at 135–36. A failure in this respect is a “process defect” that the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits. See Lawrence, supra note 45, at 345 (describing and labeling the “process
defect” term).
71
ELY, supra note 70, at 135–45; Lawrence, supra note 45, at 343–44.
72
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.”). Some earlier drafts of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment did
include the term discrimination, but that language was rejected and may have been even more vague
than the final text. CHARLES FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864–88, at 1272–73, 1282
(1971).
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protection, offering no explanation or definition as to its meaning. Equal
protection could mean equal results, equal process, equal opportunity, nondiscrimination (based on any number of factors), and various other
concepts of equality.74 In short, the language on its face is ambiguous.
Some would argue that legislative history is, likewise, susceptible to
varying interpretations. While pinpointing the exact contours of equal
protection might be impossible,75 the legislative history does suggest that
the Framers’ concept of equal protection was broader than simply
prohibiting intentional discrimination and would have included the
affirmative right to equal consideration and access.76
The Court, however, has largely ignored the ambiguity of equality
itself and instead treated the prohibition against denials of equal protection
as equivalent to, or no more than, a prohibition against discrimination.77
Discrimination, however, is not any more easily defined than equal
protection.78 Rather, discrimination is arguably more culturally contingent
than equal protection.79 Whether a particular act harms, offends, or
stereotypes someone based on race is largely dependent on the context in
which it occurs.80 As Charles Lawrence aptly pointed out: women and
men do not perceive discrimination based on bathroom signs that limit
access to a particular gender, but all would perceive discrimination if
bathrooms limited access by race.81
73
TRIBE, supra note 21, at 1437–39 (discussing equal protection’s multiplicity); James S.
Liebman, Desegregating Politics: “All-Out” School Desegregation Explained, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
1463, 1542 (1990) (noting that equal protection “does not very clearly say what it means”); powell &
Menendian, supra note 6, at 674–75.
74
TRIBE, supra note 21, at 1437–39.
75
See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954) (finding that the legislative history
is inconclusive as to school segregation).
76
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 180 (1977); ELY, supra note 70, at 84;
HOWARD JAY GRAHAM, EVERYMAN’S CONSTITUTION 8 (1968) (finding that equal protection was
designed to ensure that all had equal access to the government’s “bounties”); Brest, supra note 21, at 6–
8; see also WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO
JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 73 (1988) (noting that Congressman John Bingham, the author of section one of
the Fourteenth Amendment, initially argued that “‘[t]he spirit, the intent, the purpose of our
Constitution is to secure equal and exact justice to all men’”). This concept was ironically articulated
in a case that the Court later relied on in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896). See Roberts v.
City of Bos., 59 Mass. 198, 206 (1849) (holding that equal protection requires “that the rights of all . . .
are equally entitled to the paternal consideration and protection of the law, for their maintenance and
security”).
77
NELSON, supra note 76, at 73.
78
See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 337 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (recognizing that discrimination is not a “static” concept, but one that
Congress believed should “be shaped by experience, administrative necessity, and evolving judicial
doctrine”).
79
Alexander, supra note 44, at 219; Tristin K. Green, Work Culture and Discrimination, 93
CALIF. L. REV. 623, 625–27 (2005) (identifying “work culture as a source of employment
discrimination” and proposing a non-legal-rights approach to trigger change in discriminatory work
culture).
80
Alexander, supra note 44, at 153; Green, supra note 49, at 108.
81
Lawrence, supra note 45, at 351–52.
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In summary, the courts and academy have engaged in a vigorous
debate over the meaning of discrimination and equal protection. Those
favoring the intent standard argue that a more lenient standard would
create innumerable challenges to legitimate and neutral governmental
actions, inappropriately impeding its ability to function. Business would
suffer the same problems. Thus, neither should be subjected to legal
challenge unless they engage in immoral or wrongful conduct, which
disparate impact is not. Those opposing the standard find that the
foregoing arguments simply misunderstand law and reality. Equal
protection and discrimination cannot be fairly defined in the narrow
manner in which the Court has chosen. Equal protection encompasses
broader concepts that guarantee affirmative protection from inequality.
Moreover, even if discrimination were a narrow concept, the current
standard fails to account for many racial biases that motivate
discriminatory action. The standard’s tendency is to reject these otherwise
valid claims. The end result is simply to entrench the status quo of
inequity.
B. The Public: A Necessary Participant and a Unique Opportunity
Although significantly affecting the lives of so many and structuring
the way that government and businesses conduct themselves, the debate
over the intent standard has largely occurred solely within the courts and
the academy.82 Yet, this debate is not merely a technical or legal one, but
rather goes to the very core of discrimination. And in so far as equality
and discrimination are subject to various and evolving understandings, the
question of their core meaning is one inherently related to public norms.83
When the judiciary adopted the intent standard, however, it did so with
little explanation or analysis, much less in regard to public norms.84 What
little discussion the Court offered suggested that it did not appreciate the

82
The only significant exception to this has been in employment discrimination, where the
concept of disparate impact is more tangible to the average citizen. See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 129
S. Ct. 2658, 2667 (2009) (indicating that the minority firefighters had argued that the disparate impact
of a test was unfair and that the test was irrelevant). Yet, even here, it is far from clear that the average
person understands the alternative discrimination standards and the full ramifications of them.
83
Derek W. Black, A Framework for the Next Civil Rights Act: What Tort Concepts Reveal About
Goals, Results, and Standards, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 259, 267–68 (2008).
84
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976) (providing no rationale for the standard or
connecting it to the framers’ intent, but rather asserting it had already been adopted as the standard in
Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973), even though Keyes had provided no significant
explanation either); see also Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 279 (2001) (adopting the intent
standard as the sole basis for asserting a claim under Title VI and admitting that “[a]lthough Title VI
has often come to this Court, it is fair to say (indeed, perhaps an understatement) that our opinions have
not eliminated all uncertainty regarding its commands”); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 289 n.27 (1978).
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ambiguity of the concepts with which it was dealing, or it was simply
confident that it knew exactly what constitutes discrimination.86 Either
way, the Court substituted its own notion of discrimination for the public’s,
enshrining a static concept limited to the single form the intent standard
represents.
This Article seeks to further the conversation regarding the meaning of
race discrimination, which the Court has avoided, by examining the recent
public debate surrounding whether a cartoon depicting a policeman
shooting a chimp was racially inappropriate. By systematically examining
the public’s reaction, this Article adds substance and data—rather than just
theory—to many scholars’ arguments that concepts of race and
discrimination are part of the larger social consciousness, not individual
predilection. Thus, it also substantiates the argument that subjective
individual intentions and motivations cannot be the sole measure of legal
discrimination.
Relying on reactions to a cartoon might not be immediately intuitive to
some, but it offers deeper insights than any basic poll. First, obtaining an
unfiltered response regarding legal standards is difficult as a general
matter. Legal standards and concepts are foreign to laymen and require
significant explanation and instructions.87 Yet offering explanations runs
the inherent risk of tainting the responses.88 For this very reason, attorneys
fight vigorously over jury instructions at the trial level and challenge them
on appeal. Second, the problem of obtaining an unfiltered response may be
even more difficult in regard to discrimination standards because they are
particularly technical, having undergone various statutory changes and
judicial interpretations over time. 89 Finally, discrimination tends to be an
emotionally charged subject. In the context of an already complex legal
85

Such an approach to race discrimination is both ironic and brazen given that the Court took the
exact opposite approach to the question of age discrimination, fully analyzing the meaning of age,
including its varying interpretations and applications. See Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540
U.S. 581, 591, 596–98 (2004) (“‘Age’ is th[e] kind of word” that “has several commonly understood
meanings among which a speaker can alternate in the course of an ordinary conversation . . . .”).
86
Black, supra note 32, at 563.
87
See Jamison Wilcox, The Craft of Drafting Plain-Language Jury Instructions: A Study of a
Sample Pattern Instruction on Obscenity, 59 TEMP. L.Q. 1159, 1159–61 (1986) (discussing the
confusion that jurors face in interpreting jury instructions and the need to make them clearer).
88
See id. at 1167–68, 1175.
89
See Gerrilyn G. Brill, Instructing the Jury in an Employment Discrimination Case, 1998 FED.
CTS. L. REV. 2, §1.3 (discussing the complexity of employment discrimination standards). Although
the Court articulated what appeared to be a clear framework for employment discrimination cases in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 804–05 (1973), that standard has undergone
numerous alterations. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006); Reeves v.
Sanderson, 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000) (finding that “it is permissible for the trier of fact to infer the
ultimate fact of discrimination from the falsity of the employer’s explanation” after holding in a
previous case that proving the falsity of an employer’s explanation did not shift the burden of proof to
the defendant or warrant judgment as a matter of law for a plaintiff); St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks,
509 U.S. 502, 510–11 (1993).
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structure, presenting the issue to laypersons in a way that permits them to
make a fair appraisal is difficult.90 As scholars suggest, even judges
struggle to overcome their own biases in the context of discrimination
cases.91
In contrast, the responses to the cartoon do not involve these problems.
The cartoon does not require an explanation to generate interpretations and
reactions. In fact, that is the very point. The cartoon standing alone is
ambiguous, making no direct reference to race or a particular person.
Thus, the observers’ responses should more closely reflect their
unvarnished beliefs and notions regarding discrimination or the lack
thereof. The cartoon also offers a unique opportunity to gauge the public’s
notion of discrimination without prompting it. With that said, the data in
this study and the additional polls upon which it relies were not collected
contemporaneously with each observer’s initial viewing of the cartoon.
Most had probably read articles about the cartoon or read other observers’
comments prior to posting their own. Thus, their responses are not
scientifically controlled and are subject to a level of bias. Yet, from the
perspective of this Article, this type of bias is not entirely problematic
because the Article contends that race and discrimination are socially
constructed and contingent concepts.
Accounting for others’
understanding of race and discrimination in arriving at one’s own
understanding is a natural process. In fact, those who claim to lack any
context and speak solely from an individual perspective in regard to race
and discrimination may not be entirely credible.
In regard to race, the more significant concern regarding outside
influence arises, not from an individual’s appreciation of others’ opinions,
but rather from the awareness or fear that others are evaluating that
individual based on his or her response. Given the incredible weight
attached to race in our country, individuals might often feel compelled to
hide their true feelings and offer responses that they believe are consistent
with friends, family, and anyone in the position of judging them. The
available anonymity of internet postings and polls, however, presumably
minimizes this problem. With no other consequences attached to their
responses, individuals are essentially free to respond openly.
The responses themselves suggest this was in fact the case here.
Numerous individuals took full advantage of the apparent freedom,
providing insightful commentary as to the perceived discriminatory or
harmless nature of the cartoon. Most importantly, they did so with a depth
that permits analogies and comparisons to current and alternative legal
90
As one commentator notes, the issue of employment discrimination is often emotionally
charged and makes jury instructions in these cases both very important and difficult to craft in a way
that allows the jury to make a fair decision. Brill, supra note 89, § 1.2.
91
See Eastman, supra note 53, at 771; Eisenberg & Johnson, supra note 54, at 1190.
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discrimination standards. None of the foregoing, however, is meant to
suggest that a reliable study of public opinion is unnecessary or that such a
study would not render results slightly different than those of this Article.
In fact, the contrary is surely true, but the reactions to the cartoon
nonetheless speak volumes as to whether the public thinks intent is
relevant to discrimination and, thus, warrant serious attention.
III. A CASE STUDY OF THE PUBLIC’S REACTION TO A CARTOON
A. The News Story Behind the Cartoon
During the fall of 2008 and first months of 2009, the national
conversation was almost exclusively focused on the faltering economy and
banking system and the need for a federal stimulus package to stabilize
them.92 President Obama had been at the center of this conversation,
calling for a stimulus package months before he even took office and then
pressing for its immediate passage once he was inaugurated.93 On
February 13, 2009, just under a month after President Obama took office,
Congress passed a $787 billion stimulus package.94 The bill was passed
with almost the sole support of Democrats; not a single Republican voted
for it in the House and only three centrist Republicans voted for it in the
Senate.95 The bill was, likewise, harshly criticized and opposed by
conservative commentators and media.96 Some, including Congressman
James Clyburn, suggested that this opposition was based not just on the
merits of the bill, but on race and a refusal to accept our first African
American president.97
In the few days between when Congress passed the bill and the
President signed it into law, a story about a chimpanzee attacking a woman
made the national news.98 The victim was visiting a friend who owned an
92
Jackie Calmes & Jeff Zeleny, Obama Vows Swift Action on Vast Stimulus Package, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 23, 2008, at A1.
93
Id.
94
David M. Herszenhorn, Party Lines Barely Shift as Package Is Approved, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14,
2009, at A15.
95
Id.
96
See, e.g., Justin Quinn, The 2009 Stimulus Package: A $787 Billion Horror Story, ABOUT.COM:
U.S. CONSERVATIVE POL. (Feb. 13, 2009), http://usconservatives.about.com/b/2009/02/13/the-2009stimulus-package-a-787-billion-horror-story.htm.
97
Page Ivey, Clyburn: Opposition to Stimulus Is Slap in Face, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 19,
2009), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/02/19/clyburn-opposition-to-sti_n_168450.html; Ron
Daniels, Ignorance, White Rage and Race Fuel Opposition to President Obama, AFRICAN-AMERICAN
NEWS & ISSUES (Sept. 14, 2009), http://www.aframnews.com/html/interspire/articles/904/1/IgnoranceWhite-Rage-and-Race-Fuel-Opposition-to-President-Obama/Page1.html.
98
See, e.g., Rich Calder & Rueven Fenton, Chimpanzee Attacks Woman in Stamford, N.Y. POST
(Feb. 16, 2009, 10:34 PM), http://www.nypost.com/p/news/regional/item_gx8KmHYr7VZ6rAT
eVtl32O;jsessionid=21AE7621B190005699A95DE8AB26866F; Stephanie Gallman, Woman’s Life in
Danger After Chimp Attack, CNN.COM (Feb. 17, 2009), http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/02/17/
chimp.attack/index.html.
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aging pet chimpanzee. Without warning, the chimpanzee attacked the
visitor, mauling her face and hands.100 The owner stabbed the chimpanzee
with a knife, but was unable to stop the attack.101 The owner then called
the police department for help.102 After the police officers arrived and
exited their cars, the chimpanzee directed his aggression toward them,
chasing them back into their cars and attacking one car in an attempt to get
at the officers inside.103 In response, a police officer shot the chimpanzee
several times.104
On February 18, 2009, the day after President Obama signed the
stimulus package into law, the New York Post printed a cartoon drawn by
Sean Delonas.105 The cartoon depicted what appeared to be a police officer
shooting a monkey or chimpanzee while another officer stood behind him
saying: “They’ll have to find someone else to write the next stimulus
bill.”106 A public outcry immediately erupted, as many perceived the
cartoon as a racist depiction of President Obama.107 The New York Post’s
office was flooded with complaints that called for the newspaper to fire
Delonas, issue an apology, or suffer a boycott.108 Reverend Al Sharpton
led a crowd of protestors outside the Post’s office, shouting “‘Boycott the
Post! Shut it down!’”109
Attempting to diffuse the controversy, the New York Post responded
with an editorial that stated:
[The cartoon] was meant to mock an ineptly written
federal stimulus bill.
Period.
But it has been taken as something else—as a depiction
of President Obama, as a thinly veiled expression of racism.
99

Calder & Fenton, supra note 98; Andy Newman, Pet Chimp Is Shot to Death After Mauling
Woman in Connecticut, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2009, at A30.
100
Calder & Fenton, supra note 98; Gallman, supra note 98.
101
Calder & Fenton, supra note 98.
102
Gallman, supra note 98.
103
Calder & Fenton, supra note 98.
104
Id.
105
Delonas, supra note 8.
106
Id.
107
See, e.g., carnitas, Dissecting Sean Delonas’ NY Post Chimp Cartoon: Is This Shit Racist?,
ZIMBIO (Feb. 18, 2009, 2:35 PM), http://www.zimbio.com/NY+Post+Chimp+Cartoon/articles/
10/Dissecting+Sean+Delonas+NY+Post+Chimp+Cartoon; Karen Matthews, NY Post Cartoon of Dead
Chimpanzee Stirs Outrage, FOX NEWS.COM (Feb. 18, 2009), http://www.foxnews.com/wires/
2009Feb18/0,4670,NYPostCartoon,00.html.
108
Christina Boyle et al., New York Post Offers Half-Hearted Apology for Chimpanzee Cartoon,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 20, 2009, 1:40 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/ny_local/2009/02/19/200902-19_new_york_post_offers_halfhearted_apology.html; Karen Matthews, NY Post Apologizes to
Some over Obama Cartoon, FOXNEWS.COM (Feb. 19, 2009), http://www.foxnews.com/wires/
2009Feb19/0,4670,NYPostCartoon,00.html.
109
Matthews, supra note 108.
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This most certainly was not its intent; to those who were
offended by the image, we apologize. . . . Sometimes a
cartoon is just a cartoon—even as the opportunists seek to
make it something else.110
The editor-in-chief of the Post, Col Allan, followed up the Post’s
statement with his own, stating that “[t]he cartoon is a clear parody of a
current news event, to wit the shooting of a violent chimpanzee in
Connecticut. It broadly mocks Washington’s efforts to revive the
economy. Again, Al Sharpton reveals himself as nothing more than a
publicity opportunist.”111 Sean Delonas, the cartoonist, also spoke directly
to the media, saying:
It’s absolutely friggin ridiculous. Do you really think I’m
saying Obama should be shot? I didn’t see that in the
cartoon. The chimpanzee was a major story in the Post.
Every paper in New York, except The New York Times,
covered the chimpanzee story. It’s just ridiculous. It’s about
the economic stimulus bill. If you’re going to make that
about anybody, it would be [House Speaker Nancy] Pelosi,
which it’s not.112
Unconvinced, the protests and complaints continued, leading the
owner of the newspaper, Rupert Murdoch, to issue an apology, rather than
simply a statement. Murdoch stated:
Last week, we made a mistake. We ran a cartoon that
offended many people. Today I want to personally apologize
to any reader who felt offended, and even insulted.
Over the past couple of days, I have spoken to a number
of people and I now better understand the hurt this cartoon
has caused. At the same time, I have had conversations with
Post editors about the situation and I can assure you—
without a doubt—that the only intent of that cartoon was to
mock a badly written piece of legislation. It was not meant
to be racist, but unfortunately, it was interpreted by many as
such.113
In the days and weeks that followed, the public voiced its own opinion
regarding the meaning of the cartoon through various outlets, including
110

That Cartoon, N.Y. POST, Feb. 20, 2009, at 30.
Cartoon Said To Link Obama to Dead Chimp, MSNBC.COM (Feb. 18, 2009, 4:25 PM),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29263781/.
112
Roland S. Martin, Commentary: NY Post Cartoon Is Racist and Careless, CNN.COM (Feb. 18,
2009), http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/02/18/martin.cartoon/index.html?iref=newssearch.
113
Rupert Murdoch, Statement from Rupert Murdoch, N.Y. POST, Feb. 24, 2009, at 2.
111
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polls and internet postings.
B. Methodology
This Article analyzes the public’s response to the Delonas cartoon,
focusing on any insights that response might offer in regard to our social
understanding of discrimination and, in particular, the relevance of intent.
The first step was to gather data and source material on the public’s
response. The sources of data were: (1) the written comments that
individuals posted on news websites that ran stories or commentaries on
the cartoon, and (2) surveys conducted by news or research outlets. The
study collected the comments that were posted on news outlet websites as
of May 20, 2009.
The second step was to review and assess the written comments based
on readers’ perceptions of any racial message or intent in the cartoon.
Based on this assessment, each posting was identified as falling into one of
five categories, which ranged from those who saw absolutely nothing
offensive in the cartoon to those who were extremely offended by a
perceived racial message. Two categories represent individuals who were
not offended by the cartoon, but offered different reasons and levels of
defenses. Two other categories of readers were offended, but took
differing levels of offense. The remaining category represents a group that
did not address whether they were offended.
Respondents falling into the first category (Group One) did not find the
cartoon offensive or motivated by race or discrimination. The individuals
in this group offered varying reasons for their perception. Some indicated
that the cartoon was not racist because there was no explicit reference to
race or a human victim in the cartoon.114 They did not connect the cartoon
to any outside historical or racial context. Others in this group indicated
that, notwithstanding any context to which some might point to connect the
cartoon to race, they did not perceive any racist message or intent, but only
a cartoon attempting to be funny.115 Others took a factual approach,
reasoning that it could not be racist because President Bush had previously
been depicted as a monkey.116 Moreover, this particular cartoon was not
114
See, e.g., Okie, Response to Obama as Chimp Cartoon Blasted, WASH. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2009),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/feb/19/obama-as-chimp-cartoon-blasted/ (comment on
file with author) (“Sorry I did not take the cartoon as race based. I took it as ‘what were they thinking
when plan was written a monkey could do better.’ That is not race based. It really never came to mind
to put race into monkey cartoons.” [sic]).
115
See, e.g., citizen, Response to Cartoonist Says It Wasn’t Racist, MILWAUKEE-WIS. J. SENTINEL
(Feb. 19, 2009, 7:34 PM), http://www.jsonline.com/blogs/news/39856872.html (“Perhaps the
cartoonist demonstrated poor judgement [sic], but my guess is that he was saying ‘even a monkey
could’ve come up with that’ in a similar vein to the completely unracist ‘Infinite monkey theorem’
regarding the works of Shakepeare [sic].”).
116
See, e.g., Anonymous, Response to Times Media Critic Eric Deggans Weighs in on New York
Post Cartoon Controversy, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Feb. 19, 2009, 10:53 AM),
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even directed at President Obama because Congress, not the President,
drafts legislation.117
The second category of respondents (Group Two) indicated that the
cartoon might be offensive to some, but they did not personally find it
racist or warranting censure. In particular, they reasoned that the cartoon
was not intentionally racist or offensive, and any offense that individuals
might take was only incidental and minor.118 In short, they evaluated the
cartoon not based on its effect on the public, but solely on the cartoonist’s
intent.
The third category of respondents (Group Three) did not take any
position regarding the substance and meaning of the cartoon. Many in this
category were dismissive of the issues because the matter involved a
cartoon.119 In short, they suggested cartoons cannot be taken seriously and
do not merit this level of discussion. Others in this category focused on the
fact that the cartoon appeared in the New York Post, which they said has a
general practice of publishing incendiary and sensational material to
generate sales.120 Thus, no one should be surprised or offended, as that
would simply encourage and justify the Post’s practices. Finally, some in
this third category indicated that both the effect and intent of the cartoon
http://www.tampabay.com/features/media/article977184.ece?comments=legacy (“I thought the cartoon
was hilarious, and didn’t even think about Obama until I read about the whining. Come on . . . Bush
was compared to a chimp for 8 years and he never cried about it.”); LoveMuffin, Response to Chimp
Cartoon Makes Murdoch a Chump, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 19, 2009, 5:39 PM), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-wolff/chimp-cartoon-makes-murdo_b_168230.html#comments (“I
consider myself very sensitive to racism and I just can’t see how this is a case of racism. We’ve been
calling Bush a monkey for years, even prompting people to make collages comparing Bush’s facial
expressions to those of monkeys. I think this cartoon is clearly making fun of the stimulus bill, not
race.”); see also Steve Bell, Macho? Moi?, THE GUARDIAN, June 12, 2008, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/cartoon/2008/jun/12/georgebush (depicting George Bush as a
monkey).
117
See, e.g., Hells Kitchen Guy, Response to Chimp-Stimulus Cartoon Raises Racism Concerns,
N.Y. TIMES CITY ROOM BLOG (Feb. 18, 2009, 12:36 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/
2009/02/18/chimp-stimulus-cartoon-raises-racism-concerns/?spage=2#comments (“The Congress is the
body shaping the final look/outcome of the bill, not the President. I think Col Allan, editor-in-chief of
The Post, is right. People need to stop and think before the[y] start shouting ‘Racism!’”).
118
See, e.g., Vicious, Response to New York Post Apologizes for Editorial Cartoon, TULSA
WORLD (Feb. 20, 2009), http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/article.aspx?subjectid=16&articleid=
20090220_298_0_NEWYOR913578&archive=yes&allcom=1 (“[P]ersonally, i dont believe racism
was the NYPosts intentions. i think the message was meant to be ‘the bill was so poorly written, it
must have been written by a being of low intelligence . . . ie: a chimpanzee.’” [sic]).
119
See, e.g., firefly, Response to NY Post Cartoon of Dead Chimpanzee Stirs Outrage, DAILY
HERALD (Feb. 19, 2009, 9:45 AM), http://www.dailyherald.com/story/comments/?id+273337 (“It was
a cartoon, get over it.”); MRB, Response to Chimp-Stimulus Cartoon Raises Racism Concerns, N.Y.
TIMES CITY ROOM BLOG (Feb. 18, 2009, 12:55 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/
2009/02/18/chimp-stimulus-cartoon-raises-racism-concerns/?spage=2#comments (“How sad to see so
many people here with nothing better to do than get outraged over a stupid cartoon. . . . Lighten up,
Times readers. This is pathetic.”).
120
See, e.g., Monica, Response to A Questionable Cartoon, BOS. GLOBE (Feb. 18, 2009, 1:06
PM), http://www.boston.com/news/politics/politicalintelligence/2009/02/a_questionable.html (“The
New York Post has always tried to stur [sic] up trouble to have more people read their [sic] paper.
Look what they caused and how people are behaving.”).
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are irrelevant because principles of freedom of speech guarantee the Post
and its cartoonist the right to convey any message that they wish.121
Consequently, these respondents did not address any other underlying
issues.
The fourth category of respondents (Group Four) perceived the cartoon
to have a racist impact or message. They, however, either were not sure or
did not believe that the cartoonist intended this message. Although they
took some offense to the cartoon, the absence of clear intent moderated the
level of offense they experienced.122
The fifth category of respondents (Group Five) was extremely
offended by the cartoon. These readers believed that either the cartoonist
was intentionally conveying a racist message or that, even if he did not
have this intent, the editors should have realized the racist message.123 In
short, regardless of intent, the message was racist and highly offensive to
these readers.
In total, these written comments were more informative than any poll,
as they included the depth necessary to relate them to larger questions.
Relying on this source of data, however, posed two significant problems.
First, with depth came a diversity and variance in responses, which made
systemizing and categorizing the responses a challenge.
Some
respondents’ comments were contradictory or unclear, making it difficult
to determine in which particular category they belonged. Even when a
respondent’s comments were seemingly clear, the possibility of
misinterpreting a reader’s comments always exists. The only potential
cure, given the scope of this Article, was consistency in evaluating the
responses.
The second problem related to the websites on which responses might
be found. Certain websites and news outlets may cater to individuals who
tend to espouse certain views. Consequently, responses on such websites
alone would not fairly represent the general population. Yet, neither could
such websites be ignored, particularly if they tended to generate the most
responses. The obvious solution was to collect a large sample, but given
121
See, e.g., lovable liberal, Response to A Questionable Cartoon, BOS. GLOBE (Feb. 19, 2009,
8:08 PM), http://www.boston.com/news/politics/politicalintelligence/2009/02/a_questionable.html
(“No, sorry, as ugly as this cartoon is, it’s protected by the First Amendment—and it ought to be.”).
122
See, e.g., Jason, Response to A Racist Cartoon?, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2009,
3:23 PM), http://opinion.latimes.com/opinionla/2009/02/a-racist-cartoo/comments/page/2/#comments
(“Racist? Maybe. Tasteless? Certainly. Funny? Definitely. People need to lighten up and realize that
race and our differences will always be something people find humorous (in private And [sic] public
circumstances). How many people saw the cartoon and chuckled? Thousands. How many people saw
the cartoon and were outraged? Thousands, Everything [sic] is strictly a matter of opinion.”).
123
See, e.g., Tony the Tiger, Response to Chimp-Stimulus Cartoon Raises Racism Concerns, N.Y.
TIMES CITY ROOM BLOG (Feb. 18, 2009, 12:21 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/
2009/02/18/chimp-stimulus-cartoon-raises-racism-concerns/?spage=2#comments (“How can the New
York Post continue to offend large groups of its readers by continuing to post Mr. Delonas’ cartoons?
They need to stop providing Mr. Delonas with a forum . . . .”).
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the expanse of the internet, the sample itself could be overwhelming.
Ultimately, I decided in advance to collect responses from all of the major
national newspapers and internet news sources and to collect responses
from at least one regional newspaper in each of the nation’s regions. When
the actual collection began, however, I found that the entire data available
was much smaller than anticipated. Not all national newspapers ran a
story, much less their own story, on the cartoon.124 As a result, many
national sources lacked any written comments by readers. Second, to the
extent regional newspapers even ran a story, it was often an Associated
Press story, rather than one written by their own staff.125 In the absence of
a story written by a newspaper’s own staff, the public rarely posted
comments.126 In short, far fewer written responses were posted than the
study had anticipated. The result was both positive and negative. The
positive was that rather than just taking a sample of the available data, the
study collected responses from most of the locations that contained any
more than just a few random comments. Thus, the study approached a
complete review of the data.127 The negative was that there was simply
less data than I would have preferred.
124

For instance, the Chicago Tribune did not report on the actual story, but merely ran an editorial
discussing the public’s response to the cartoon and the editorial posting online did not offer readers a
chance to comment or respond. See Clarence Page, At Least the “Chimp” Cartoon Got Us Talking,
CHI. TRIBUNE, Feb. 22, 2009, at 28.
125
See, e.g., NY Post Cartoon of Dead Chimpanzee Stirs Outrage, DAILY HERALD, Feb. 18, 2009,
available at http://www.dailyherald.com/story/?id=273337#storycomments; N.Y. Post Cartoon of Dead
Chimpanzee Stirs Outrage, USA TODAY, Feb. 19, 2009, available at http://www.usatoday.com/
news/nation/2009-02-19-monkey-cartoon_N.htm; Political Cartoon Featuring Chimp Sparks Protests,
FOXNEWS.COM (Feb. 18, 2009), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/02/18/political-cartoonfeaturing-chimp-sparks-protests.
126
Compare Political Cartoon Featuring Chimp Sparks Protests, supra note 125 (generating 14
total responses) with Foon Rhee, A Questionable Cartoon, BOS. GLOBE, Feb. 18, 2009,
http://www.boston.com/news/politics/politicalintelligence/2009/02/a_questionable.html
(generating
187 responses).
127
The stories that the study draws upon include Sylvester Brown, Jr., Was the Chimp Cartoonist
a Victim of Subconscious Indoctrination?, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 19, 2009, available at
http://www.stltoday.com/blogzone/a-conversation-about-race/general-news/2009/02/was-the-chimpcartoonist-a-victim-of-subconscious-indoctrination; Jennifer Harper, Cartoon Wars Erupt Anew; Image
of Slain Chimp Seen as an Obama Slight, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2009, at A03; Eugene Kane,
Cartoonist Says It Wasn’t Racist, MILWAUKEE-WIS. J. SENTINEL, Feb. 19, 2009, available at
http://www.jsonline.com/blogs/news/39856872.html; Tony Norman, Don’t Shoot the Cartoonist,
Fellow Cowards, PITTSBURG POST-GAZETTE, Feb. 20, 2009, at A-2; N.Y. Post Cartoon of Dead
Chimpanzee Stirs Outrage, supra note 125; Opinion, A Racist Cartoon?, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2009,
available at http://opinion.latimes.com/opinionla/2009/02/a-racist-cartoo.html; Kathleen Parker,
Outrage over Cartoon Chimp Outweighs its Level of Offense, SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb. 25, 2009, at
A19; Rhee, supra note 126; Political Cartoon Featuring Chimp Sparks Protests, supra note 125; Dawn
Turner Trice, On Different Pages When It Comes to Race, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 23, 2009, at C13; Jeff Yang,
Monkey Business, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 25, 2009, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?f=/g/a/2009/02/25/apop022509.DTL; Chris Marsh, Monkeys, Presidents and Racism,
AZCENTRAL.COM BLOG (Feb. 19, 2009, 12:48 PM), http://www.azcentral.com/members/Blog/
ChrisMarsh/46606; Martin, supra note 112; Leonard Pitts, Jr., Of Chimps and Chumps,
OREGONLIVE.COM (Feb. 25, 2009), http://www.oregonlive.com/opinion/index.ssf/2009/02/
of_chimps_and_chumps.html.

528

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:503

C. The Results
09, the study collected a total of 1,697 written
As of May 20, 200
responses from internet websites. The largest number of respondents fell
into the Group Five, wh
hich found the cartoon highly offensive or racist,
regardless of intent. With 767 responses to this effect, this group
constituted forty-nine peercent of the total responses.128 The next largest
number of respondents fell into Group One, not finding the cartoon
W
654 responses to this effect, this group
offensive or racist. With
constituted forty-two peercent of the total. The three other categories
garnered only a small peercentage of the total responses. Even combining
these groups, they amoun
nted to less than ten percent of the total responses.
The group that simply diismissed the cartoon or had a neutral impression of
it was five percent of th
he total. Those who perceived a racist impact or
message in the cartoon, but were not highly offended because the
cartoonist may not have intended it, represented only three percent of the
pted that the cartoon might be offensive to others,
total. Those who accep
but did not find it person
nally offensive or warranting any level of censure
amounted to only one peercent of the total. Although the study attempted to
avoid simplifying respo
ondents’ positions, after they were categorized,
Group One was combin
ned with Group Two and Group Four with Group
Five to also answer the basic
b
question of whether the cartoon was racially
offensive. Combining the groups, fifty-two percent found the cartoon
racially offensive, while forty-three percent did not.

Written Response to Cartoon by Percentage
Offended
Regardless of
Intent
49%

Not Offended
42%

Offended But
No Intent
3%
128

For a full table of the colllected responses, see Appendix.

Not Offended
Because No
Neutral Intent
5%
1%
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This study’s overall results were generally consistent with other polls
and surveys.129 The most significant difference from other polls was that
the polls limited respondents’ options to that of finding offense or no
offense. They did not have a middle category that was unsure or thought
that other issues were more important. Interestingly, the group that might
have otherwise been in the middle in those polls did not appear to evenly
divide themselves between those taking offense and those not. Rather, in
comparison to the written responses, the middle group in the other polls
either did not vote or tended to find the cartoon offensive, as the
percentage finding the cartoon not offensive in the polls was similar to the
percentage in the written responses, but the percentage finding it offensive
jumped more significantly in the polls.
Although small in scope, fifty-nine percent of respondents in a poll
conducted by the online magazine Zimbio indicated that the cartoon was
offensive while forty-one percent did not find it offensive.130 A poll by the
Cleveland Plain Dealer garnered over 1,750 responses, with forty-two
percent finding the cartoon intentionally racist, and another twelve percent
finding it offensive, but allowing that the offense may have been
unintentional.131 Only thirty-four percent indicated the cartoon did not
have anything to do with Obama.132 An additional nine percent indicated
that, although they did not find it offensive personally, they saw how
others could.133 In total, fifty-four percent found the cartoon offensive and
forty-three percent did not. A Philadelphia Inquirer poll garnered a
similar number of total responses,134 but unlike the Cleveland Plain
Dealer, did not offer readers the chance to respond with any nuance. Just
asking the basic question of whether respondents thought the cartoon was
racist, fifty-three percent in the Philadelphia Inquirer poll indicated that it
was and forty-seven percent indicated it was not.135

129
See, e.g., JJ, Is the NY Post Chimp Cartoon Racist?, ZIMBIO (Feb. 18, 2009, 3:45 PM),
http://www.zimbio.com/NY+Post+Chimp+Cartoon/polls/1/results/NY+Post+Chimp+Cartoon+racist.
130
Id. (collecting sixty-four votes).
131
Gloria Millner, The New York Post’s Chimpanzee Cartoon: Do You Think It’s Racist?,
CLEVELAND.COM (Feb. 18, 2009, 3:37 PM), http://blog.cleveland.com/openers/2009/02/new_york_
post_cartoon_seems_to.html.
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
Online Poll, Was the Delonas Cartoon Offensive?, PHILA. INQUIRER (on file with author; no
longer available online).
135
Id.
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Percent Finding Cartoon Racist or Offensive
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The most sophisticated survey was conducted by HCD Research,
which polled a nationally representative cross-section of Democrats,
Republicans, and Independents. In total, sixty-one percent of respondents
thought the cartoon was directed at President Obama.136 This perception
was most prevalent among Democrats at seventy-three percent,137 but fiftynine percent of Republicans also thought the cartoon was directed at
Obama.138 Unlike the other surveys, however, HCD Research did not
explicitly frame the question in terms of race, but rather asked whether the
cartoon was politically incorrect.139 Seventy-nine percent of Democrats
thought it was politically incorrect, as well as fifty-one percent of
Republicans.140 Overall, sixty-three percent thought it was politically
incorrect.141 It then gave these respondents the option of selecting from
seven different ways in which it might be politically incorrect. Seventyone percent of these indicated that it was racially inappropriate.142 The poll
also queried respondents as to who “should be responsible for dealing with
the repercussions and backlash that erupted after the publishing of this
political cartoon?”143 Only forty-five percent thought the cartoonist should
be responsible, while strong majorities thought that both the editors and the
New York Post itself should be held responsible.144
136
Press Release, Holistic Commc’ns Decisions, All Political Parties Agree that NY Post Political
Cartoon Was Racist (Feb. 24, 2009), http://www.hcdi.net/News/MediacurvesRelease.cfm?M=265.
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
HCD RESEARCH, http://www.mediacurves.com/pdf/ReportJ7284.pdf (last visited Oct. 6,
2010).
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
Id.
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In total, 5,075 indiv
viduals responded to the cartoon through either a
poll or a website review
wed by this study. For purposes of rough global
estimate, the study comb
bined all respondents into a single chart.145 Group
Five, which found the cartoon highly offensive or racist regardless of
intent, remained the larrgest, constituting fifty-three percent of the total
responses. Group One,, which did not find the cartoon to be racist or
offensive, remained the next largest group, constituting forty-one percent
of the total responses. The only other group garnering any significant
percentage was the one that perceived a racist impact or message, but did
ve because the cartoonist may not have intended it.
not find it highly offensiv
This group represented only
o
four percent of the total. Those who accepted
that the cartoon might bee offensive, but did not find it offensive themselves
amounted to less than on
ne percent of the total. Combining Group One with
Group Two and Group Four
F
with Group Five, the total internet responses
indicate that forty-one percent
p
did not think the cartoon was offensive
while fifty-seven percentt found that it was offensive.146

Polls and Written Responses Combined
Offended
Regardless of
Intent
54%

Not Offended
41%

Offended But
No Intent
4%

Not Offended
Because No
Intent
Neutral 0%
1%

D. A Focus on Effects ovver Intent
The varying responsses to the cartoon, while not uniform across the
polls and written com
mments, followed a consistent pattern. First,
145
Combining the responden
nts into a single chart is truly only for the purposes of a rough global
estimate because some of the pollls did not include all five categories and, thus, respondents in those
polls necessarily fell in group one or four when combined with the others.
146
Of course, those who weere dismissive of, or neutral toward, the cartoon were only accounted
for in the written responses and, th
hus, not fairly measurable in relation to the polls collectively.
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regardless of how the question was phrased or responses categorized, a
strong majority found the cartoon offensive. The only arguable exception
was with the written comments, but there, a significant number of
respondents did not take a position on whether the cartoon was offensive.
Among those who took a position, nearly fifty-five percent found it
offensive while only forty-five percent did not. Second, when respondents
were given an option beyond just indicating whether the cartoon was or
was not offensive, the perception of a racial message was overwhelming.
Putting aside the question of whether someone was personally offended,
those who could perceive race or understand how someone might be
offended constituted nearly sixty percent of the written responses and
sixty-five percent in the Cleveland Plain Dealer’s poll. Thus, those who
entirely overlooked or rejected a racial message in the cartoon were a
significant minority.
Beyond the numbers, the written comments provide even further
insight into the public’s perception of the cartoon. In particular, those who
did not find the cartoon offensive offered diverse reasons for their position.
For instance, some took the approach of apologists who felt it necessary to
defend the cartoon with all plausible arguments, including, as discussed
earlier, formalist arguments that focused on the fact that Congress rather
than the President writes legislation and that George W. Bush had also
been compared to a monkey during his presidency.147 Some of these
defenses did not necessarily reject the notion that someone could have
interpreted a racial message; rather, their point was that such an
interpretation is incorrect.148 In effect, apologists of this sort rejected the
notion that context, culture, or history matter. For them, the cartoon should
147
See, e.g., Hells Kitchen Guy, Response to Chimp-Stimulus Cartoon Raises Racism Concerns,
N.Y. TIMES CITY ROOM BLOG (Feb. 18, 2009, 12:36 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/
2009/02/18/chimp-stimulus-cartoon-raises-racism-concerns/?spage=2#comments (“The Congress is the
body shaping the final look/outcome of the bill, not the President. I think Col Allan, editor-in-chief of
The Post, is right. People need to stop and think before the[y] start shouting ‘Racism!’”); Lee,
Response to Commentary: NY Post Cartoon Is Racist and Careless, CNN.COM (Feb. 18, 2009),
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/02/18/martin.cartoon/index.html?iref=newssearch (comment on
file with author) (“There was no outcry when Bush was caricature as a Dufuss. Or the kid from ‘Mad’
Magazine? How about cartoon poking fun of Christian?” [sic]).
148
See, e.g., kf2001, Response to New York Post Apologizes for Editorial Cartoon, TULSA
WORLD (Feb. 20, 2009), http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/article.aspx?subjectid=16&articleid=
20090220_298_0_NEWYOR913578&archive=yes&allcom=1 (“The cartoon wasn’t funny. Period.
However, I don’t look for racism or a reason to think others are racist and therefore didn’t see some
grand insult against Obama or me since I happen to be black. Americans of every color voted for this
Obama and he is our president. Let’s focus on rebuilding and revitalizing our country . . . no matter
what color you are!”); mitchgat, Response to Cartoonist Says It Wasn’t Racist, MILWAUKEE-WIS. J.
SENTINEL (Feb. 19, 2009, 1:47 PM), http://www.jsonline.com/blogs/news/39856872.html (“We MUST
be careful not to abuse the usage of the word racist. . . . Call this what it really is: insensitive to racial
stereotypes. Not acceptable but a far cry from being racist. The intention of the artist was to perhaps
shock but more than likely, he was using a current event to demonstrate his opinion. I am not
defending him[,] but stupidity and making a poor (I think unitentional [sic]) choice, is (in most cases)
not a sin.”).

2010]

CULTURAL NORMS AND RACE DISCRIMINATION STANDARDS

533

be evaluated solely on its face, or in a vacuum. This very point, however,
reveals a significant divergence from some others who defended the
cartoon. Another group of defenders, albeit much smaller, did not reject
context at all. That the cartoon was referencing President Obama or
conveying anything beyond its facial depiction did not occur to them.149
These differing defenses and perceptions of these two groups raise an
issue at the core of race and discrimination: whether race and
discrimination have fixed meanings or are social constructs. As discussed
earlier, the literature on this point concludes that race and discrimination
only have the meanings that society gives them.150 For instance, Charles
Lawrence argues that a racist “message obtains its shameful meaning from
the historical and cultural context in which it is used and, ultimately, from
the way it is interpreted by those who witness it.”151 Robin Lenhardt,
likewise, indicates that race and its discriminatory impacts derive from the
consensual meanings that communities share.152 Thus, it is only this larger
context that allows us to distinguish between discriminatory and nondiscriminatory conduct. Without context, we misidentify some acts as
discriminatory and trivialize others that are in fact discriminatory.153 In
short, the foundation of race and discrimination is their context, and,
without it, they have no objective meaning.154
The cartoon and many of the written responses to it bear this point out
exactly. Without a larger context, the cartoon on its face is nothing but a
monkey and a reference to current legislation. An individual who did not
understand the political context regarding the stimulus bill might struggle
to derive any meaning from the cartoon. For such an individual, the
cartoon would, at most, convey a general statement regarding the lack of
intelligence that most legislation represents, but not necessarily a specific
attack on the stimulus bill. No readers, however, seemed unable to draw
the connection to the wrangling over the stimulus bill, as it had been in the
news headlines for months and the cartoon was timely in responding to the
bill’s passage.
The written responses, however, revealed a serious interpretative gap
in regard to the ape. That gap arose directly from individuals’ differing
149

See, e.g., Tiffanyc, Response to Commentary: NY Post Cartoon Is Racist and Careless,
CNN.COM (Feb. 18, 2009), http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/02/18/martin.cartoon/index.html
?iref=newssearch (comment on file with author) (“I had no idea that if I drew a chimp, gorilla or
anything similar that I would be called a racist. Now that I’m aware, I will be more sensitive to the
issue. However, monkey’s [sic] are used ALL the time to represent silly, child-like behavior. If I had
seen the cartoon before reading this article, I would have assumed the police were shooting the people
who wrote the bill. Which was not Obama. Why take offense to THIS monkey?”).
150
See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text.
151
Lawrence, supra note 45, at 351.
152
R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 803, 823–24 (2004).
153
Id. at 875–77.
154
Id. at 877 (concluding that the risk of stigmatization is being examined in a vacuum).
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knowledge and appreciation of our historical and cultural context. As
discussed above, popular culture has in the past routinely depicted African
Americans as primates in the effort to demean them. Those who took
offense to the cartoon most often did so because they saw the cartoon as
perpetuating the historical association between African Americans and
primates.155 They drew upon their personal experiences and cultural
knowledge to immediately link the cartoon with Obama. The cartoon
standing alone was ambiguous, but historical associations eliminated the
ambiguity for them. Moreover, for them, this historical context was so
powerful that no formalistic reasoning regarding who writes legislation
could change the message they interpreted.
Age necessarily plays a significant role in individuals’ familiarity with
this imagery and its historical context. Some younger individuals did not
intuitively connect the cartoon to the President and, for this reason, did not
take offense. For them, the cartoon was confusing or unclear. As one
educator wrote:
I teach high school social studies and my student
population is 95% Native American. Today I’ve shown three
social studies classes the cartoon. Of 79 students (14–17
years old) only 1 student identified a racial component to the
cartoon. After explaining some of the concerns regarding the
cartoon most students could not acknowledge or comprehend
the alleged racism.156
Those who indicated the cartoon was not offensive, of course, included
more than just those who lack the context from which to make inferences
about the cartoon. But a careful reading of those defending the cartoon
reveals that many of them defended the cartoon by decontextualizing it.157
155

See, e.g., Dhoff, Response to A Questionable Cartoon, BOS. GLOBE (Feb. 18, 2009,
12:57 PM), http://www.boston.com/news/politics/politicalintelligence/2009/02/a_questionable.html
(“Regardless if you feel as though this cartoon is innapropriate [sic] or not, you can not ignore the racist
undertones of comparing African Americans to monkeys. This comparison WAS a part of this
country’s history and an ugly part at that. To create (the illustrator) or to publish (the editors) a cartoon
with such undertone is irresponsible and ignorant. Americans come in different shapes, colors,
religions, races and sensitivity levels. At some point, we need to be mindful of these sensitivity levels
and stop turning a blind eye towards it.”); telecasterplayer, Response to NY Post Cartoon of Dead
Chimpanzee Stirs Outrage, DAILY HERALD (Feb. 19, 2009, 11:12 AM), http://www.dailyherald.com/
story/comments/?id+273337 (“It was ignorance plain and simple. This country’s history with race is
not secret, and mainstream comics as recently as the beginning of the 20th century frequently portrayed
African Americans as simians. It’s in all of the history books.”).
156
Martin, supra note 112.
157
fredlet, Response to Monkey Business, S.F. CHRON. (Feb. 25, 2009, 4:58 PM),
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article/comments/view?f=/g/a/2009/02/25/apop022509.DTL&plckOn
Page=2&plckItemsPerPage=10&plckSort=TimeStampDescending (“There is no denying that we still
have racism within the human race, but the arguments that are used to point out this cartoon as a racist
one seem weak to me and the issue trumped up. The fact that W [George W. Bush] was frequently
compared to a chimpanzee also weakens their supporting arguments. My first impression was that the
author was stating that any monkey can do a politician’s job and that the stimulus bill was badly written
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They implicitly rejected the relevance of context in interpreting the
cartoon, including the historical portrayals of African Americans as apes,
by interpreting it in isolation. For instance, one respondent wrote, “I’m
very sympathetic towards the ‘racist past’ you speak of Mr. Martin, but
maybe the ‘lens’ with which you see through is to blame and not the image
itself.”158 Those rejecting context, however, constituted a clear minority.
The overwhelming majority derived their understanding of the cartoon
almost exclusively from its context.
These varying reactions to the cartoon only reaffirm scholars’ insights
regarding the cultural contingency of race and discrimination. When the
cartoon is disconnected from our cultural and historical experience, it loses
meaning. Without any personal understanding of that experience,
individuals find it hard to comprehend messages that are obvious to others.
As a practical matter, one could try to communicate a racist message, but
fail miserably if the recipient did not share the cultural understandings
upon which the message is based. Likewise, one could intend to send a
harmless message, but nonetheless send a racist message because how the
message will be interpreted is not entirely within the control of the author.
In short, whether a message or action is discriminatory is, in many
respects, culturally contingent.
In addition to the cultural contingency of discrimination, the responses
raised important questions regarding the relevance of intent. Are the
impact and meaning of messages or actions dictated solely by social
perceptions? Is the harmful impact of one’s actions negated if one’s intent
is innocent? Does a harmful impact become a little worse or better
depending on whether an actor’s intent is malevolent or innocent? The
polls that only offered respondents two choices provided no insight into
these questions, but the others, along with the written responses, spoke
directly to these questions.
The largest group, constituting more than half of all respondents,
indicated that it was seriously offended by the cartoon regardless of the
cartoonist’s intent. Many in this group, however, added that they thought
Delonas intended to convey a racial message and, thus, their responses

. . . but I guess that just shows my prejudice against politicians . . . .”); oblique, Response to Monkey
CHRON.
(Feb.
25,
2009,
5:56
PM),
http://www.sfgate.com/cgiBusiness,
S.F.
bin/article.cgi?f=/g/a/2009/02/25/apop022509.DTL (“For years, George Bush was directly compared to
Curious George the Monkey. . . . President Obama is not going to make everyone happy and when he
makes an unpopular decision he’s going to get criticism. If he can’t handle that heat, he needs to resign
the job to someone who can. If he gets compared to a monkey—so what? That comparison has a
precedent, thanks to Curious George. All the whiners need to grow up and stop playing the race card.
That card is tired.”).
158
John, Response to Commentary: NY Post Cartoon Is Racist and Careless, CNN.COM (Feb. 18,
2009), http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/02/18/martin.cartoon/index.html?iref=allsearch.
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regarding the relevance of intent may be overstated.
Nevertheless, this
group, as a whole, expressed the notion that race and discrimination are
culturally contingent social constructs. They are not defined by the
message one intends to convey, but rather by the context in which they
occur. Thus, in the instant case, the cartoonist cannot presume to act in a
vacuum, nor control his message once it is released. Some respondents
further indicated that the cartoonist was bound to apprise himself of the
context and act accordingly because he is responsible for the results of his
actions.160
The HCD Research survey results showed an even stronger focus on
assigning culpability regardless of intent. HCD’s survey, however, did not
focus solely upon the cartoonist, but allowed respondents to assign blame
to different levels of the Post’s staff. Given this option, an overwhelming
number of respondents assigned responsibility to the highest levels of the
newspapers, finding that the newspaper itself and its editors were at
fault.161 Interestingly, because so many focused on the upper levels of the
paper, only forty-five percent indicated that the cartoonist himself was
responsible. In effect, the respondents were indicating that, even if the
cartoonist lacked the intent to offend, it was in fact offensive and his
superiors had the obligation to recognize this before printing the cartoon.
For these respondents, the effect of the cartoon, rather than the intent, is all
that matters; whoever has the final say in an action should be held
accountable regardless.
While those who weighed the cartoon based on its contextual effect
regardless of intent were the large majority, the cartoonist’s intent was
relevant to others’ responses as well. In particular, the perception of the
cartoon turned almost entirely upon intent for those in Groups Two and
Four, which together comprised about five percent of the total respondents.
Both of these groups thought the cartoonist lacked the intent to offend, but
they split as to whether the lack of intent outweighed any racial message in
159
See, e.g., Mark Stave, Response to A Racist Cartoon?, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 19,
2009, 5:15 PM), http://opinion.latimes.com/opinionla/2009/02/a-racist-cartoo/comments/page/1/
#comments (“The author of the cartoon is a graphic artist, presumably versed in the language of
images. This person chose to use the image of a monkey. That visual image speaks clearly to those
who already refers [sic] to Blacks as monkey, as well as to anyone familiar with the visual language of
American racism. The publishing of the cartoon may be more oriented along a profit motive, but
innocence of the connotations seems very unlikely.”).
160
See, e.g., ten10tothe28, Response to Monkey Business, S.F. CHRON. (Feb. 25, 2009, 4:23 PM),
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article/comments/view?f=/g/a/2009/02/25/apop022509.DTL&plckOn
Page=3&plckItemsPerPage=10&plckSort=TimeStampDescending (“Cultural sensitivity is real simple.
Just ask yourself how you think your audience will receive your juvenile, stereotypical and racist
attempt at exercising your right to free speech. If you can imagine someone in the target group of your
caricature being offended by the caricature you are making, then it is in fact offensive. How could
anyone responsible for the cartoon depicting Obama as a Chimp who got shot not understand that the
caricature could be received as insulting and even racist?”).
161
Press Release, supra note 136.
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the cartoon. Respondents in Group Four did not think the lack of intent
excused the racial message, but did allow that the absence of intent
mitigated the ultimate effect of the cartoon. Consequently, they found the
cartoon only moderately offensive. In contrast, Group Two indicated that,
although the cartoon might be offensive to some, the lack of intent largely
eliminated the problem. In effect, individuals could understandably take
offense, but the cartoonist is not responsible because he lacked intent.
The only group that consistently failed to address the relevance, or
irrelevance, of intent was Group One, the group that steadfastly defended
the cartoon. Most in this group did not broach the issue of intent simply
because it was not relevant to the points they made.162 Most defended the
cartoon because they did not perceive a racial message or thought such a
message was contrary to the facts.163 Given these defenses, one could
fairly assume that these respondents thought the cartoonist lacked any
discriminatory intent. Nevertheless, with the exception of a few, those in
this group did not base their defense of the cartoon on the notion that the
cartoonist lacked intent.164 Thus, their comments do not add much to an
assessment of the relevance of intent.
In summary, the data reveals two significant points about intent and
effect. First, the majority of the public found the cartoon offensive because
of its cultural message, not its intent. Even if the cartoonist’s intent was
innocent, the cartoon sent unacceptable racial messages. Beyond this
group, no other large consistent stance regarding intent emerged. Those
outside the majority splintered into varying smaller groups, some finding
that innocent intent excused the cartoon, others finding innocent intent
mitigated the cartoon’s effect to some extent, and others simply ignoring
162
See, e.g., JRyan, Response to Commentary: NY Post Cartoon Is Racist and Careless,
CNN.COM (Feb. 18, 2009), http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/02/18/martin.cartoon/index.html?
iref=newssearch (comment on file with author) (“It’s a dumb cartoon, I disagree with its message (such
as it is) but honestly doubt the cartoonist’s intent was racist. The takeaway is: ‘the stimulus bill is so
bad, it might as well have been drafted by a monkey.’ If the cartoonist had wanted to convey the idea
that ‘Obama is a monkey,’ he would have had any number of caricaturist’s tools at his disposal to do
so: putting a suit and tie on the chimp, making the animal’s face resemble O’s etc, etc. That he didn’t
do any of these things tells me that wasn’t his intent. So my verdict is: Lame—YES, Insensitive to
possible interpretations—YES, Intentionally racist—NO.” [sic]).
163
See, e.g., Kiah, Response to Commentary: NY Post Cartoon Is Racist and Careless, CNN.COM
(Feb. 23, 2009), http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/02/18/martin.cartoon/index.html?iref=allsearch
(“I don’t think this particular drawing was meant to be racist because of the events of the chimp behind
it. I think mon[k]eys might be smarter about a stimulus bill than the idiots in washington. George
Bush which I don’t care for was drawn in the images of a mon[k]ey all the time and nobody cared.”
[sic]).
164
For an example of a defense based on intent, see shredder_01, Response to Monkey Business,
S.F. CHRON. (Feb. 25, 2009, 12:26 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article/comments/
view?f=/g/a/2009/02/25/apop022509.DTL&plckOnPage=5&plckItemsPerPage=10&plckSort=TimeSta
mpDescending (“I think all you people who are so upset over this cartoon need to get a firmer grip on
reality. Fact is that this is not a racist depiction of Barack Obama, it is a pointed swipe at his
administration and nothing more. . . . I am sorry for all of those that want to find racism under every
rock and around every corner, but in my opinion there really was no intent to be racist here.”).
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intent because they thought the cartoon was not racial. Second, putting
aside the significance of intent in measuring offense, the notion that, as a
matter of fact, the cartoonist did not intend to be offensive, was present to
some extent in almost every group that responded. Many who objected to
the cartoon thought the cartoonist intended a racial message, but many of
those who were offended also allowed that he may not have intended the
message; they simply did not think the lack of intent mattered. And, of
course, the lack of intent is consistent with a core factor for all other
groups. Thus, the large majority of respondents thought the cartoonist did
not intend to be offensive, but a nearly equal large majority across all of
the polls and responses still found the cartoon to be inexcusable.
IV. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE PUBLIC’S REACTION
A. Correlating Public Opinion with Legal Standards
Based on the data collected above, most of the general public
conceives of discrimination as a broader concept than the courts’ current
intent standard. While all would agree that intentionally racially biased
acts are sufficient to demonstrate discrimination, discrimination is not
limited to those acts. Across the board, the majority of respondents
reflected the notion that the effect of one’s actions is an appropriate
measure of discrimination. The more difficult question is what other antidiscrimination standard might be consistent with the broader public
understanding of discrimination. At least three categories of alternatives to
the intent standard have been used or identified in the past.
First, prior to being overruled, lower courts regularly used a disparate
impact or effects tests, under which a prima facie case of discrimination
was established by showing that a particular policy or practice had a
disproportionate effect on a racial group.165 This standard permitted a
plaintiff to assert a claim without demonstrating any intentional bias. A
defendant, however, could still avoid liability if it could justify its actions
or policy with some legitimate end that made the particular action
necessary.166 Some have advocated for a second alternative that one might
165
See, e.g., Quarles v. Oxford Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 868 F.2d 750, 754 (5th Cir. 1989)
(allowing a case to proceed under Title VI through a disparate impact analysis); NAACP v. Med. Ctr.,
Inc., 657 F.2d 1322, 1324 (3d Cir. 1981) (“[D]isparate impacts of a neutral policy may be adequate to
establish discrimination under Title VI . . . .”); GI Forum v. Tex. Educ. Agency, 87 F. Supp. 2d 667,
677–79 (W.D. Tex. 2000) (applying a burden shifting disparate impact analysis). The Court in
Alexander v. Sandoval held no such cause of action existed, nor ever had. 532 U.S. 275, 282–83
(2001). Prior to Sandoval, however, lower courts found that Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Service
Commission, 463 U.S. 582 (1983), had recognized a cause of action for disparate impact. See, e.g.,
Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 70 (1992); Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287,
292–96 (1985); N.Y. Urban League, Inc. v. New York, 71 F.3d 1031, 1036 (2d Cir. 1995); Roberts v.
Colo. Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 832 (10th Cir. 1993).
166
See, e.g., GI Forum, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 677.
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call pure disparate impact, which would not afford a defendant any
excuses. Under such a standard, disparate impact alone is sufficient to
justify a remedy. The only legal question is whether the disproportionality
is high enough or the cultural perception of the impact consistent enough to
label it discriminatory.
The third alternative goes in the opposite direction of a pure disparate
impact standard and includes several variants. These variants require some
low level of intent or culpability in addition to a discriminatory effect. For
instance, some have argued for a standard that imposes liability for
disparate impacts only when the defendant has acted negligently in regard
to the impacts.167 In effect, if a defendant should have foreseen the impact
in advance and could have avoided it without any unreasonable burden, it
would be required to do so.168 Courts and scholars have explored another
variant that would require deliberate indifference to racial impacts rather
than just negligence.169 The standard would prohibit disparate impacts
when a defendant knows or should have known of a racially disparate
impact, a less harmful and reasonable alternative is available, and either no
countervailing interest outweighs the racial harm or the defendant would
have acted differently had the harm fallen upon another racial group.170
The majority of the respondents’ reaction to the cartoon is generally
consistent with a disparate impact or discriminatory effect standard in
some form, but no majority emerged that would clearly support any
particular disparate impact variant. The largest coherent group of
respondents seemed to support an approach that would strictly prohibit
disparate impacts or discriminatory effects. This group rejected the
justifications, excuses or explanations for the cartoon, measuring the
cartoon solely from its cultural interpretation or effect.171 But again, this
group alone was not a majority.
Outside of this group of respondents, the groups were relatively small.
Also, given the fine distinctions between the disparate impact variants that
167

David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 934 (1993).
Id. at 969.
169
See, e.g., Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999) (applying deliberate
indifference to sexual harassment); Bryant v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-38, 334 F.3d 928, 932–34 (10th
Cir. 2003); Horner v. Ky. High Sch. Athletic Assoc., 206 F.3d 685, 692–93 (6th Cir. 2000).
170
Black, supra note 32, at 576–77, 579.
171
See, e.g., Dhoff, Response to A Questionable Cartoon, BOS. GLOBE (Feb. 18, 2009,
12:57 PM), http://www.boston.com/news/politics/politicalintelligence/2009/02/a_questionable.html
(“Regardless if you feel as though this cartoon is inappropriate or not, you cannot ignore the racist
undertones of comparing African Americans to monkeys. This comparison WAS a part of this
country’s history and an ugly part at that. To create (the illustrator) or to publish (the editors) a cartoon
with such undertone is irresponsible and ignorant.”); Kate, Response to Chimp-Stimulus Cartoon
Raises Racism Concerns, N.Y. TIMES CITY ROOM BLOG (Feb. 18, 2009, 10:16 PM),
http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/02/19/new-york-post-apologizes-for-chimp-cartoon/?scp=11&
sq=obama+chimp+cartoon&st=cse&apage=1#comment-310149 (“History shows that media have used
primates to degrade all sorts of groups, including the Irish (quite a long time ago). The purpose is to
degrade someone and an entire race, in this case Obama. I don’t buy that it’s just a cartoon.”).
168
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incorporate some level of intent, drawing any firm correlations between a
group of respondents and a particular variant would stretch credulity. With
that said, the respondents in the smaller groups did express views that were
generally consistent with a disparate impact standard that accounts for
intent on some level. These smaller groups regularly took into account the
intent or rationale behind the cartoon.172 Thus, their responses were
inconsistent with a pure or aggressive disparate impact standard. Instead,
these respondents would place significant weight on discriminatory effect,
but would excuse or discount that effect under certain circumstances.
For instance, the HCD survey suggested that the public took a more
complex approach to evaluating the cartoon, similar to that of a disparate
impact standard based either on negligence or deliberate indifference.
When queried by HCD regarding who is responsible for the cartoon, a
large majority indicated that someone, regardless of who, at the paper
should be held responsible, but stark distinctions arose when respondents
were given the opportunity to assign that responsibility to particular people
or institutions.173 Only forty-five percent thought the cartoonist should be
responsible, while sixty-one percent thought that the editor who approved
the cartoon should be responsible.174 If a majority was willing to excuse
the cartoonist who actually created the inappropriate material, they must
have thought the cartoonist lacked the perspective with which to evaluate
his own work or that he had benign intentions. Yet, his arguably benign
motives did not excuse the editors. The public viewed the higher level
employee, or the one who makes the final call, as having an affirmative
responsibility to evaluate the cartoon and prevent inappropriate material.
In short, the editor either knew, or should have known, of the
discriminatory nature of the cartoon, and thus is responsible regardless.
This responsibility is similar to what a negligence or deliberate
indifference variant would impose.
Ideas consistent with this type of responsibility also appear in the
written responses. Some respondents contemplated that the cartoonist may
not have intended the cartoon to be offensive, but they argued that he
172
See, e.g., James FM, Response to Chimp-Stimulus Cartoon Raises Racism Concerns, N.Y.
TIMES CITY ROOM BLOG (Feb. 18, 2009, 10:40 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/
02/19/new-york-post-apologizes-for-chimp-cartoon/?scp=11&sq=obama+chimp+cartoon&st=
cse&apage=2#comment-310229 (“The NY [P]ost cartoon was more idiotic than racist, the artist and
the editor should have known better than to print something like that in the current world we live in.”);
Jerry, Response to Chimp-Stimulus Cartoon Raises Racism Concerns, N.Y. TIMES CITY ROOM BLOG
(Feb. 18, 2009, 11:07 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/02/19/new-york-post-apologizesfor-chimp-cartoon/?scp=11&sq=obama+chimp+cartoon&st=cse&apage=2#comment-310323
(“The
Post misses the point. Before publishing the cartoon, the Post editors should have realized that the
cartoon would be regarded as racist, and that should have been the reason why it should not have been
published. Saying now that it was not intended as a racist statement doesn’t do it. The insensitivity of
the Post is the point.”).
173
Press Release, supra note 136.
174
Id.
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should have known better.
Thus, they still found the cartoon offensive,
but only mildly so. Interestingly, the line between these respondents and
those who assessed the cartoon solely on its effect blurs when viewed from
the perspective of the appropriate legal standard. Those who objected to
the cartoon solely based on effect sometimes added that they afforded no
excuse to the cartoonist, in part, because he should have known of its
effect.176 Thus, while favoring a pure or aggressive disparate impact
standard on the whole, these respondents suggest that a disparate impact
standard that places some level of responsibility on individuals to avoid
foreseeable racial harms is not inconsistent with their views. Yet, even if
one included these respondents among those favoring an impact standard
that accounts for a low-level intent, they would be far from sufficient to
create a majority.
Given the foregoing nuances, the best one can do is suggest a standard
that would be palatable to a majority. Ultimately, a disparate impact
standard that accounts for some form of intent is that standard. Those who
account for intent in their impact standards would logically reject the
notion of basing liability solely upon effect. Thus, while the pure disparate
impact group is the largest on its own, this group is also at the end of the
ideological spectrum and would be unable to carry a majority. A pure
disparate impact standard would be inconsistent with all except the core
group supporting it and that group’s numbers remain at less than a
majority. This core group, however, would presumably see the disparate
impact standard that accounts for low-level intent as the closest standard to
its own. This group combined with those more directly favoring a
disparate impact standard that accounts for intent would amount to a
majority.

175
See, e.g., j, Response to A Questionable Cartoon, BOS. GLOBE (Feb. 18, 2009, 12:17 PM),
http://www.boston.com/news/politics/politicalintelligence/2009/02/a_questionable.html (“So much for
our new, post-racial society. I hope our President handles this latest insult with the grace and charm
that he’s exhibited on other occasions. A racial firestorm is the last thing this country needs right now.
There’s too much work left to be done to be distracted by ignorant cartoonists.”).
176
See, e.g., Gutless Oscar, Response to N.Y. Post Cartoon of Dead Chimpanzee Stirs Outrage,
USA TODAY (Feb. 22, 2009, 3:43 AM), http://content.usatoday.com/community/comments.aspx?
id=34190138.story&p=3 (“The cartoonist should be fired for being brainless, and the editor should be
fired for being brainless. The way to be certain that these two clowns are fired is by way of continued
protests and boycotting this paper and its advertisers. Bring the heat until they’re out. This depiction
and the editor’s ‘ok’ to publish it are inexcuseable. This printed material cannot be acceptable in
2009.”); ten10tothe28, supra note 160 (“Cultural sensitivity is real simple. Just ask yourself how you
think your audience will receive your juvenile, stereotypical and racist attempt at exercising your right
to free speech. If you can imagine someone in the target group of your caricature being offended by
the caricature you are making, then it is in fact offensive. How could anyone responsible for the
cartoon depicting Obama as a Chimp who got shot not understand that the caricature could be received
as insulting and even racist?”).
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B. The Relevance of Public Norms to the Law
While the public’s reaction to the cartoon suggests that the courts’
current intent standard is inconsistent with majoritarian concepts of race
discrimination, to some, it is not immediately obvious that public opinion
even matters on this point, particularly in regard to constitutional claims.
The Constitution is not subject to public opinion.177 In the strictest sense,
our government and our citizens, where applicable, must bend their actions
toward the Constitution’s requirements—not the reverse. When the public
disagrees with constitutional principles, its only option is to amend the
Constitution. That said, constitutional principles do not exist in a vacuum.
Rather, the courts apply the Constitution to and within an evolving cultural
context. Thus, public norms are necessarily relevant to constitutional
application and interpretation.
The relevance of cultural norms and sentiment is clearest in the context
of the First Amendment. The First Amendment grants freedom of speech
and prohibits the government from establishing religion, but does so in
only the most general terms. Thus, the Amendment’s language itself
provides relatively little assistance in resolving real cases. Decisive
questions such as what amounts to speech or an establishment of religion
are in many instances heavily dependent on public perceptions. For
instance, the Supreme Court has concluded that whether a particular act—
as opposed to a verbal statement—expresses an idea that the First
Amendment would protect is dependent on how others would perceive the
act.178 Likewise, whether certain government action amounts to an
establishment of religion has in some instances depended on whether an
objective observer would interpret the action to endorse religion.179 In
short, while the constitutional protections regarding speech and religion are
unwavering in principle, the particular protections that these principles
afford are dependent on evolving public and cultural understandings.
Although less obvious, the Fourteenth Amendment is no more
removed from its cultural context than the First Amendment, particularly
in regard to discrimination. Some criticize the Court for its attention to

177
See, e.g., Santa Fe Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 304–05 (2000) (stating that
constitutional rights are not subject to public opinion or vote); W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 665–66 (1943) (“One’s conception of the Constitution cannot be severed from one’s
conception of a judge’s function in applying it. The Court has no reason for existence if it merely
reflects the pressures of the day.”).
178
See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 66
(2006).
179
See, e.g., Cnty. of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492
U.S. 573, 620 (1989) (relying on a standard that asked whether the objective observer would perceive
the government action to be an endorsement of religion); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984)
(same).
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context, but the fact remains that context has been crucial to both the
Court’s best and worst decisions. For instance, in Plessy v. Ferguson, the
Court addressed whether segregation on train cars violated equal
protection.181 To answer the question, the Court relied on social context
and the message that the government was or was not sending.182 Of
course, the Court in Plessy misinterpreted that message, but the Court used
the same attention to context to justify its later holding in Brown v. Board
of Education.183 There, the Court held that school segregation was
unconstitutional not because of any tangible inequity in the schools, but
because segregation sent a message of African American inferiority.184
Moreover, this message was conveyed even if the legislature and schools
made no explicit reference to purported inferiority of African Americans.
What had changed from Plessy to Brown was not the nature of segregation,
but rather the cultural norms regarding the meaning of equality and
discrimination.
Even in the language the Court uses to describe members of racial
groups, we see that context matters. In the Court’s earlier cases, the Court
referred to African Americans as “negroes,” but later shifted to “black” and
more recently to “African American.”185 These changes are responses to
society’s perception of these labels as appropriate, discriminatory, or nondiscriminatory. For instance, referring to African Americans as “colored”
would not have been perceived as offensive during much of the twentieth
century.186 In fact, during the early twentieth century, “colored” was a
polite or non-discriminatory label for African Americans, and many
180
See, e.g, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 379–80 (2003) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(asserting that the majority had abandoned the normal strict scrutiny standard and applied a lower level
of scrutiny based on the unique context of higher education).
181
163 U.S. 537, 540–42 (1896).
182
See, e.g., id. at 551 (“We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff’s argument to consist
in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of
inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored
race chooses to put that construction upon it.”).
183
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
184
Id. at 494–95.
185
See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 749, 764
(2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting the word “negro” from many historical decisions, but using
“black” or “African American” in his own language); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469, 469 (1986) (using the term “black”); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 725 (1974) (referring to
African Americans as “negroes”).
186
In fact, the leading civil rights group of the time, the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People, included the term in its name. Langston Hughes contrasted the word
“colored” with “nigger,” using the former as a standard non-derogatory reference and the latter the
opposite. LANGSTON HUGHES, THE BIG SEA 268–69 (1940) (“The word nigger to colored people of
high and low degree is like a red rag to a bull. Used rightly or wrongly, ironically or seriously, of
necessity for the sake of realism, or impishly for the sake of comedy, it doesn’t matter. Negroes do not
like it in any book or play whatsoever, be the book or play ever so sympathetic in its treatment of the
basic problems of the race. Even though the book or play is written by a Negro, they still do not like it.
The word nigger, you see, sums up for us who are colored all the bitter years of insult and struggle in
America.”).
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African Americans referred to themselves with this term.
The same is
simply not true today.188 In short, equal protection analysis cannot escape
the cultural context that surrounds it; context may not be explicitly
determinative for equal protection, but as a practical matter, the law
depends on it.
Resolving the question of whether public opinion matters for
antidiscrimination statutes is far simpler—the answer must be yes. All of
the foregoing points about the cultural contingency of race and
discrimination are equally applicable to statutes, but other concrete
principles further bind statutory law to public opinion. First, our
legislators are entrusted with representing our interests and views. Thus, at
least at the time of enacting law, public opinion is at the forefront. Second,
civil rights legislation, in particular, is not just a codification of equal
protection or an attempt to prohibit criminal, morally culpable, or
malevolent conduct.189 Civil rights legislation is much broader and farther
reaching than that. It ultimately broaches the question of how we want to
structure society.190 In that respect, it is no different than negligence,
product liability, and other forms of civil liability that attempt to create
financial incentives and disincentives to act or not act in a particular
manner.191 These incentives and disincentives, however, are not based on
any indelible concept of “right” and “wrong” or “fault” and “no-fault.”192
187

Id. at 145.
See, e.g., Lindsay Lohan Calls Obama First “Colored President” in Interview, FOXNEWS.COM
(Nov. 12, 2008), http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,450347,00.html (indicating the term is
derogatory and was used by a popular racist figure). But see Mario Sevilla, Lohan Calls Obama
“Colored,” NAACP Says No Big Deal, A + E INTERACTIVE: BAY AREA ARTS AND ENT. BLOG (Nov.
12, 2008, 2:21 PM), http://blogs.mercurynews.com/aei/2008/11/12/lohan-calls-obama-colored-naacpsays-no-big-deal/ (quoting the NAACP communications director as saying the term is not derogatory,
but outdated).
189
See Oppenheimer, supra note 167, at 970 (critiquing the notion that moral wrongfulness is
relevant to discrimination).
190
Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Biases, Preferences,
Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 219 (1992); Black, supra note 32, at 543–44.
191
See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation of
Costs, 78 HARV. L. REV. 713, 714 (1965) (“‘[C]ompensation’ as an aim means only that it is deemed
more desirable for persons other than the injured to pay the costs of the injury. This is because if many
pay the cost of an accident rather than one . . . the social dislocation costs of the accident may be
reduced; this is the basis of the theory of loss spreading. . . . For when those who are ‘more able to
pay’ pay, we believe that fewer secondary undesirable effects will occur.” (footnotes omitted)); John
C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 519 (2003) (suggesting that twentieth
century changes in tort law were due to political and social influences stemming from a growth in the
industrial economy, emphasizing physical injury and deemphasizing traditional torts like trespass);
Gregory C. Keating, The Idea of Fairness in the Law of Enterprise Liability, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1266,
1270 (1997) (discussing the competing interests of fairness, loss spreading, deterrence, as well as
fairness, social utility and economic efficiency); Stephen D. Sugarman, A Century of Change in
Personal Injury Law, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2403, 2409–10 (2000) (suggesting that, as a response to
increased social concerns for fairness and cost-spreading, the twentieth century saw an increase in the
protections and remedies available to negligence victims).
192
Oliver Wendell Holmes conceded that a “common ground at the bottom of all liability in tort”
is “very hard to find.” OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 77 (Little, Brown and Co.
188
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Rather, these civil liability regimes reflect social policy regarding what is
best for society as a whole.193 Civil rights legislation, likewise, reflects
social values regarding the type of neighborhoods we want to create, the
type of work environment we want to foster, and the amount of equal
access to commerce we think is appropriate.194 In all of these respects,
civil rights legislation reaches private conduct, not just governmental
conduct (which is required by the Constitution), and mandates a particular
structure for society reflective of its public values. In short, constitutional
and statutory law regarding race discrimination are both necessarily
intertwined with public norms and opinions related to race discrimination.
V. CONCLUSION
While courts and scholars have battled over race discrimination
standards for decades, they have generally overlooked the public’s role in
the conversation. Understanding public and cultural norms, however, is
crucial when setting race discrimination standards because the meaning of
race discrimination is culturally contingent, varying across time and
context. Activity that falls on one of the extreme ends of the spectrum can
be identified as discriminatory or appropriate with little effort, but the
middle ground is ambiguous. Cultural norms help resolve this ambiguity.
By analyzing the public’s reaction to an ambiguous cartoon, the synergy
between discrimination and public norms more becomes obvious and
compelling. The failure to account for this synergy in antidiscrimination
law creates the risk that a group of elites will substitute their world view
for that of everyone else. In fact, the public’s reaction to the Delonas
cartoon suggests the courts may have done just that with the intentional
discrimination standard.

1923) (1881). At most, the common law of torts simply reflects tendencies, which are even at odds
with one another at times. Id. at 78. In the end, the law does not create prohibitions based on an
inherent form of fault, “[w]hat the law really forbids, and the only thing it forbids, is the act on the
wrong side of the line, be that act blameworthy or otherwise.” Id. at 110.
193
See Calabresi, supra note 191, at 717; Goldberg, supra note 191, at 519 (suggesting that
modern changes in tort law were in response to political and social influences and were a move away
from traditional torts based on other considerations); Sugarman, supra note 191, at 2432.
194
Fair Housing Act, Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619, 3631
(2006); Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2006) (prohibiting discrimination
in public accommodations); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006).

546

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:503

APPENDIX
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N.Y. Times:
Chimp
Stimulus
Cartoon
USA Today
St. Louis
Dispatch
MilwaukeeWisconsin J.
Sentinel
St. Petersburg
Times
Arizona
Republic
Daily HeraldArlington
Heights, IL.
Miami Herald
Tulsa World
L.A. Times
San Francisco
Chronicle
Total
Percentage

Category
2

2
34

5

2

Category
3

Category
4

Category
5

1

3

7

0

5

22

1

1

9

12

2

16

4

63

6

3

11

59

89

5

11

9

165

198

6

25

13

343

87

12

4

39

5

1

6

3

1

4

12

7

5
10

1

4

2

1

6

24
29
9

2
5
1

54

4

3
1
2

25
30
14
23

654

23

72

52

767

42%

0.0146%

4.59%

0.0331%

49%

